To Achieve Scale,REDD Must Embrace Satellite Technology

The world has agreed that tropical rainforests need protection, so the multi-billion dollar REDD+ program is on its way. The challenge is its practical implementation. DMCii’s Prof. Jim Lynch explains why satellite surveying could do for the 21st century carbon trading economy what seismic surveys did for 20th century oil and gas.

July 16 2012 |     Carbon projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) can save rainforests and slow climate change by keeping carbon locked in trees, but this mechanism and its sibling, REDD+, can only scale up if investors will know how many trees there are, and how much carbon is stored within them and whether this carbon is staying put, year on year.

Current methodologies being advocated within the United Nations require the use of forest audits based on traditional forestry management methods of the developed world, but these are simply too expensive to work in the developing world. The Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, has more than 100 million hectares of inaccessible rainforest, and the country doesn’t have the resources to survey this from the ground in a cost-effective manner, let alone quantify the results into a standardised format to be cross-checked against forest stocks elsewhere.

Lessons From The Energy Sector

Perhaps the emerging carbon-trading economy can take a lesson from the oil and gas economy that dominated the previous century. Sinking exploratory wells represented an impossibly costly way to explore. So a standard technological solution emerged to discover and quantify oil and gas stocks: seismic surveys. Low-frequency sound waves are propagated into promising geological sites and the time taken for them to reflect back is employed to build up a picture of oil and gas deposits. The technique began with wildcatters in the 1920s exploding dynamite sticks; today it involves carefully planned networks of seismic sources and geophones to build up a three-dimensional map of reservoir architecture, with raw acoustic results processed via sophisticated algorithm chains and skillfully interpreted. Modern seismic surveys are employed not only to find new wells but also tracking fluid-front movement to trace a reservoir’s depletion over time.

What is the equivalent technological solution for forest monitoring? Earth observation. The only way REDD+ can be made to work on a global scale in a truly open, transparent way is satellite imaging. That’s why I’m working with satellite imagery and services provider DMCii in the UK to develop standardised information products for forest monitoring, tailored to the requirements of REDD+ as well as comparable international forest monitoring schemes – such as the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan, ensuring countries importing timber to Europe are logging on a legal and sustainable basis.

What Satellites Can Deliver

Earth observation can contribute to two aspects of the forest monitoring problem. Firstly, as a means of ascertaining where all the trees are, and how many of them there are. Satellites’ wide area view enables a highly-accurate census to be made. Then comes the stage of processing the imagery to make biomass estimates and gain a measurement of the carbon stocks bound up in them – seeing the carbon for the trees – and then, just as importantly, to estimate carbon fluxes: how that carbon stock is changing over time.

The last half-century of Earth observation has demonstrated that it is not the individual remote sensing image but a sequence of images over time that gives the most added value. When it comes to tropical rainforests this is especially true: one can never have enough data about these vast expanses, possessing their own self-generating climate systems – repeated monitoring is important simply to catch gaps in clouds. Then such gaps can be mosaiced together to build up a complete picture.

We’re not starting from a blank page. The rapid development of satellite-based precision agriculture offers a model to learn from. Satellites are increasingly – and lucratively – being employed to monitor crop growth to guide the most-efficient application of fertiliser and pesticide for optimal yield. Many of the methods and algorithms originally developed for precision agriculture provide a measurement of photosynthetic activity can be also be applied to forest monitoring.This is very exciting – with the right models and algorithms we can analyse carbon pools for different climates around the world.

How We Do It

But won’t monitoring from space be astronomically expensive? Not necessarily. DMCii has built a business in selling imagery from the Disaster Monitoring Constellation, a fleet of separately-owned and collectively-managed satellites performing medium-resolution Earth monitoring. As the satellites, built by the UK’s Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. are affordable, and the data is too.

Of the users around the globe making use of DMCii data products, one of the most notable is Brazil, as one of the few forested developing nations to establish an annual forest audit. Brazil is also one of the inspirations for REDD+, having cut its deforestation by half in the last decade and a half. Both achievements are based on the use of satellite data.

Brazil’s space agency the National Institute for Space Research (known by its Spanish initials as INPE) approached DMCii in 2005 to begin purchasing DMC imagery. Today DMCii’s contribution is core to Brazil’s forest monitoring programme, having moved beyond regular land cover mapping to active guidance of enforcement efforts. The distinctive patterns of deforestation have become familiar sights – ‘fishbone’ lines of clearing extending from a main road as the transportation route, or alternatively a river system.

Early on, in my role with the OECD Sustainability Agency, we could challenge the authorities with this irrefutable evidence, and help guide fact-based policy. In addition to starting to brake deforestation rates, Brazil has also set up new national parks, indigenous reserves and sustainable logging zones. It’s a template for what REDD+ could accomplish on a broader scale– and all down to satellites.

The precise nature of DMCii information products and services for REDD+ and related forest monitoring activities are still to be determined. We envisage two main classes of user: firstly, people mainly interested acquiring auditing information in a quick, digestible format, such as financial investors. Secondly, the national governments themselves, who will want to demonstrate their effective reduction in emissions clearly with a high degree of quality and precision, so they can be rewarded for their efforts. We’d also supply the associated measurement and management systems – based on standard geographic information systems (GIS) –to employ the data.

Theoretically the information products would be data-neutral; in other words we could employ free imagery from government satellites such as the US Landsat for annual forest surveys, which is the minimum frequency that REDD+ certification is likely to require. But, once you consider the billions of dollars set to be pledged for REDD+, then the case is clear to acquire additional paid-for data to step up the frequency and accuracy of satellite observations. In the case of particular regions at risk then the frequency of acquisitions could reach daily revisits using the DMC satellites. Because they operate in a constellation, their acquisition opportunities are not constrained by the fixed orbit of a single satellite, which might take weeks or months to return to a given target.

Last year’s addition to the DMC, the NigeriaSat-2 satellite, offers very high resolution 2.5 m imagery, that is potentially capable of surveying individual REDD+ projects in detail (incidentally giving Nigeria a superior imaging capability to SSTL’s homeland of Great Britain). The UK and SSTL has also announced plans for a new generation of NovaSAR small radar satellites, able to perform observations through clouds or at night, and sensitive to complementary environmental parameters such as leaf area index and soil moisture.

DMCii also acquires additional regional forest monitoring capabilities with third party specialists. So we wouldn’t always perform mapping or ground truthing ourselves, but are active in establishing regional partnerships to do just that. In May, a DMCii led consortium won a place on the UK Department for International Development (DfID) Forest Governance Markets and Climate (FGMC) Framework Agreement meaning that we will be able to bid for projects to monitor forest governance and deforestation globally. The multidisciplinary consortium, known as inFORm, comprises commercial and academic partners with skills such as forest mapping, carbon accounting, timber tracking, policy development and broad ranging Earth Observation technologies, allowing a holistic approach to tackling deforestation.

For me, one of the strengths of satellite products is that for all the data they contain, they can typically be understood by everyone, not just forest specialists – regional politicians to national media to village headmen. If you present people with clear and accurate information about their national resources, they can then make informed decisions about their future exploitation. In the past satellite images have helped motivate Brazilian politicians to take action and helped guide public opinion too.

It is clear that the fruits of past development activities have not always been fairly shared. I was in Ghana in 2010 and I went to villages well away from Accra and asked them what they wanted most. Some electric lights so we’re not in darkness every night was the answer – and running past their village were thick power lines on massive pylons.

REDD+ needs to be fair if it is going to be truly sustainable. Satellite imagery can help establish a level playing field of information, showing where the trees are actually placed in areas of contested land ownership, and serving as a basis for organised action on the ground, such as surveying and enforcement activities.

Through its staff and parent company SSTL, DMCii has a promising record in knowledge transfer; it has worked with customer nations such as Egypt, Turkey and Nigeria to not only deliver satellites but the beginnings of full national space programmes along with them. The same kind of knowledge sharing, to make REDD+ a bottom-up initiative that local populations have a true stake in, will be crucial.

While satellites offer a technical solution to the challenges of implementing a carbon trading economy based on preserving the tropical rainforests – just as seismic surveys proved to be the technical foundation of the expanding oil and gas industry – the political and social factors inherent in making REDD+ a reality will decide whether it succeeds or fails.

About the author

Trained in industrial chemistry and soil microbiology, Professor Jim Lynch OBE has served as Chief Executive of the UK government’s executive agency, Forest Research, Co-ordinator for the OECD Programme on Biological Resource Management and currently sits on the Board of the European Forestry Institute and Africa’s Council for the Frontiers of Knowledge. As Distinguished Professor of Life Sciences (Emeritus) at the University of Surrey, Prof. Lynch has begun work on a new project to develop forest monitoring information products for DMCii, a subsidiary of University of Surrey spin-off company Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL).

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Red, White, and Green:A Solution to Cancelled Fireworks in 2012

As a child, Steven Apfelbaum remembers the explosive excitement of Fourth of July fireworks. These days, though, he has found a quieter, gentler way to celebrate the US Independence Day that still includes bright lights.  

4 July 2012 | My childhood memories of the fourth conjure up cool evenings and hundreds of fireworks – simulated bombs bursting in air in all their Francis Scott Key splendor. Every year this experience occurred with religious fervor, as my three brothers, mom and dad, and even the family dog piled into the family sedan and the family drove off to the nearest park to watch the fireworks.

In the early 1970’s my family had a large boat-like convertible. With the top down, we’d park on a hill and overlook a larger region, taking in multiple fireworks displays. This spectacle was dazzling for young kids.

Every part of the early experience was fired by gasoline, powered by petroleum, or involved gunpowder and various chemicals. Quick flashes of light are created from the pop of gunpowder and the eye burning bright flash from burning magnesium powder. Green colors are from powdered copper that is impregnated on paper that is wrapped into the firework. As the fuse burns the fire encountered each of the impregnated papers, and each gives off the various colors as they ignite, associated with the unique color of each element as it combusts. Cobalt for dark blue; copper for greens and red; and so on.

While the excitement of the display was initially captivating, as I grew older, watching the excitement experienced by others became equally or more entertaining. Parents usher children to focus and pay attention to the event, keeping them from spiraling into skirmishes and disinterest and distractions. The youngest children sit there like jello blobs with bobbing heads, as result of sleepiness as they were out past bedtime, and a wrenched neck from looking up, sometimes for hours, as every firework is launched.

Another summer favorite – lightening bugs. And while I understand that watching lightening bugs is different than watching fireworks, in many ways it is the ultimate fireworks display. There before you are tens of thousands of illuminating insects dancing’s skittering across the sky, some moving quickly horizontally, others flying upward twenty to thirty feet and then descending rapidly toward the ground.

I began to develop another level of appreciation for these nightly displays when I watched the bobbing headed young children, the five to ten agers, and then adults becoming completely absorbed and entranced by the bugs. The initial silence and awe was often followed by questions, “Why do that do that? How do they do that?”

Informative spectators explain that males lightening bugs are displaying with one signal type and the females with another. Then the biochemistry is explained: the light is produced by a little insect using laboratory precision mixing of Luciniferin and an enzyme called lucinerferinace. The light is a precise chemical reaction involving no ignited wick, no gasoline, or no gunpowder. No heat, no waste products—just a few chemicals manufactured within the body of lightening bugs as an attraction mechanism for finding mates.

We still gather the kids, and neighbors come to visit during the summer, to see the lightening bugs. But, instead of jumping in the car, we walk to the nearest hill on our southern Wisconsin farm shortly after sundown. It is about then when the first flashers come out. Initially you can only see the closest ones, but as the darkness deepens, thousands come into focus every second. Particularly in areas with healthiest and restored ecosystem, along the stream courses, around the perimeter of wetlands, and in diverse wildflower growth areas, the displays are heavenly. Neighboring corn and soybean fields harbor some but far less, then the displays over higher quality habitat. And the grand finale doesn’t end, as the display goes on all night, with some insects still attempting to eke out their mate attraction behavior as the sun is coming up the next morning.

In a time when energy conservation, and reduced emissions of atmospheric gasses is important, celebrating the fourth – or the joy of any other mid summer evening – is possible by seeking out lightening bug displays. After the children begin skirmishing and boredom sets in at the fireworks show, or you find yourself looking for a few moments of quiet, find a secluded field and enjoy a truly green fireworks display.

Steven Apfelbaum is the founder of Applied Ecological Services, Inc., a full service environmental consulting and ecological restoration company with ten offices in the United States and two abroad. Apfelbaum is co-author of the Restoring Ecological Health to Your Land series, which provides practical step-by-step instructions to restoration ecology and the care of native plants. He is also the author of the award winning book, Natures Second Chance, which recounts the thirty-year story of how he and his family restored a dairy farm to prairie, forest, trout stream and wetlands near Juda, Wisconsin. Both books are available at www.amazon.com.

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Does the Ecosystem Markets Metaphor Blind us to Ecosystem Complexity?

30 March 2012 | Ecosystem markets aim to preserve nature in part by recognizing the value of ecosystem services – such as water filtration, flood control, and carbon sequestration.   But does the market metaphor create the illusion of simple solutions?   UC Berkley Professor of Energy and Resources Richard Norgaard argues this week on the Ecosystem Commons that it does just that in a post entitled Ecosystem Services: From Eye-Opening Metaphor to Complexity Blinder, which is based on his 2010 paper of the same name.

“The metaphor of nature as a stock that provides a flow of services is insufficient for the task ahead. Indeed, the simplicity of the stock-flow framework blinds us to the complexity of the human predicament,” he writes. “The complex practice of understanding ecosystems is being skewed and simplified to inform markets.”

This, he says, distorts our understanding of complex ecosystems and creates the illusion that we can keep burning through resources if we just save a few patches of wetland.

He then poses three questions to readers:

  • First:   Should we be concerned about long-term effects of this shift?
  • Second:   Don’t we need to shift our focus to national and global politics and institutions to address the broader issues?
  • Third:   How do we design ethical reasoning into environmental governance?

The Answers Thus Far

So far, he’s received two answers: one from Restoration Systems President George Howard and one from Ag Resource Strategies President Tim Gieseke.

Both men are mitigation bankers, and both concede Norgaard’s point – but then argue that the markets metaphor is as good a beginning as we are going to get, and that global solutions are unworkable at this time.

“It is awkward, and as you say, simplified, but that simplification is occurring for each of these oikos dimensions,” writes Gieseke.   “Ecological economics is more than interdisciplinary; it is the integration of the earth’s life support system and the means by which humans will value it.   And since we just began this journey during our lifetimes, we are children in understanding how to go about it.”

“National and global institutions are notoriously insensitive to local conditions, inevitably provide one size fits all – or nothing – politicized solutions in the name of ‘equity’,” writes Howard.   “These tend to be costly, ineffective and too frequently counter-productive. Action locally will not be directed globally.”

Join the Discussion

It’s a fascinating discussion that’s just begun to roll – and we suspect it will attract many more comments before wrapping up.   You can follow the discussion here, and feel free to drop your own two cents in.

 

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A Look at the Links Between Water, Food Security, and Ecosystems

The theme of this year’s World Water Day is water and food security. Coordinated by the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Water Day aims to highlight critical international freshwater issues. This year’s topic calls our attention to growing – and interlinked – pressures on agriculture, livelihoods, and ecosystems. Here, we offer a brief introduction to the water and food security challenge and some innovative solutions.
 
 
Nine billion people are expected on Earth by 2050. That’s an extra two billion mouths to feed, or the equivalent of another Africa, North America, and Europe appearing on the planet. Pressure will intensify on agricultural lands and in turn on water resources, since water is a major constraint on the amount of food that a society can produce. What’s more, individual water footprints  are likely to grow: a recent report from the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Water Management Institute (IMWI) notes that if current trends of urbanization and changing dietary habits continue, water required for agriculture will increase between 70 and 90 percent by 2050.
 
Yet 40 percent of the world’s population could be facing severe water scarcity by mid-century, according to just-released estimates from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Taken together, these numbers are troubling: on one side of the equation, more people each consuming more water; on the other, predictions of increasing drought, changing rainfall patterns, falling water tables, and shrinking rivers and lakes.
 
The Environment and Food Production
Climate change  and ecosystem degradation will only exacerbate scarcity of clean water. Around the world, aquifers are being overdrawn, soil nutrients depleted, and water resources polluted with eroded soils, little-treated waste, and agricultural fertilizers. These actions do not only limit agricultural productivity in the long run, they damage other functions of healthy ecosystems that societies depend on.  
 
Forests, grasslands, and wetlands, for example, can filter out water pollution, regulate stream flows, recharge aquifers, limit erosion, and absorb and store flooding. These benefits are collectively known as “watershed services,” and society can’t do without them. A  healthy environment can also support soil nutrient cycling, the insects and birds that pollinate our crops, and the biodiverse ecosystems that offers resilience against agricultural pests and disease, a changing climate, and other system shocks.
 
Around the world, ecosystem services like these are in crisis. We will experience as much as a 25 percent gap  between food supply and demand by mid-century from ecosystem service degradation (biodiversity, soil nutrient loss and soil erosion, declining storage capacity, vulnerability to pests and disease due to monoculture). UNEP/IMWI estimate  that we’re losing five to ten million hectares of agriculture land every year to degradation.
 
What’s more, these problems aren’t evenly distributed. Developing countries are both disproportionately vulnerable to climate change and disproportionately dependent on agriculture. And global water scarcity particularly threatens women, who are often responsible for collection and food production, and at greater risk for malnutrition when food is scarce.  But this means also that better management of water-food-ecosystem linkages holds tremendous potential for poverty alleviation and benefits for women.
 
Farming for the Future
 
As UNEP/IMWI argue in Ecosystems for Water and Food Security, these challenges require a global shift to managing agroecosystems, not agriculture. An ecosystems approach to water and food security  means “growing” both food and ecosystem services like pollination, adequate infiltration to the water table, or soil nutrient cycling.  
 
It also means investing in our natural water infrastructure that can deliver clean, ample water supplies cost-effectively and sustainably.  
 
And, as FAO notes, the agricultural sector can grow more food with less water, through more efficient irrigation and less water-intensive crops, water reuse and alternative supplies (such as treated wastewater), and rainwater harvesting.

– Stay tuned for updates: we’ll continue to cover World Water Day over the course of the day.
– Visit the World Water Day
official website to learn more about the water-food security challenge.

Additional resources

Navigating the Durban Daze

Year-end climate talks are still two weeks away, and already the array of panels, speakers and workshops is dizzying, Ecosystem Marketplace offers up this list of the COP 17 side events we’ll be attending/covering/watching through our news coverage and blog.

16 November 2011 | If you’re having trouble deciding which COP 17 side events to attend, and are already feeling lost in a frenzy of panels, speakers and workshops – fear not!

To make your life just a little easier in the run-up to COP17, Ecosystem Marketplace offers up this list of the COP 17 side events we’ll be attending/covering/watching (ahem, NGO party!) through our news coverage and blog. We think you’ll like them, too – click on each day to see full event details.

This brief synopsis of some of the many outstanding events will take you to our Events calendar. There, we will update you daily with the “must attends” as we find them during the conference. Feel free to contact us with any additional events you think would be of interest to EM readers.

Day 1 – 11/28/11
We’ll just be hitting the Durban scene (and recovering from Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s righteous climate rally the night before!) but may drop by the official Q&A with the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to pick their brains before the conference hits full swing.

Day 2 – 11/29/11
We will formally kick off our time in Durban by attending two UNFCCC Official Side Events (OSE). Today, you can explore enforcement, anti-corruption, monitoring tools, and Japanese bi-lateral cooperation on mitigation in developing countries – just maybe attendees can catch the latest on Japan’s Bilateral Offset Credit Mechanism?

Day 3 – 11/30/11
Our lively hand-picked events for Day 3 focus on REDD+ from an ‘on-the-ground’ perspective. Events cover social and political issues, sub-national strategies, and social and environmental safeguards. The four side events we picked are all OSE, with one co-hosted by yours truly – our parent organization Forest Trends.

Day 4 – 12/1/11
Day 4 features a wealth of side events for fellow Durban-goers. Official side events revolve around the role of the private sector, while a workshop (Forest Trends again!) will get participants talking about community involvement.

Day 5 – 12/2/11
Day 5 is another busy day with many choices to burden the indecisive. We highlight a half-day conference on REDD+ in the Amazon (by CIFOR and Amazonas). Several OSE and IETA events covering Australia, social standards, trading systems, and professionalization are our other top picks.

Day 6 – 12/3/11
On this supremely busy Saturday in Durban, our choice events will be Agriculture and Rural Development Day (addressing climate change challenges by way of sustainable agriculture), followed by a stop by the World Climate Summit to hear what business leaders envision for the Future of the Carbon Markets. And Forest Trends hopes to entice you away from the ICC for an afternoon of South-South dialog on REDD+ and PES between Ecuador, Costa Rica and Mexico.

Day 7 – 12/4/11
On Day 7, CIFOR’s Forest Day is jam-packed with forums on safeguards, Africa, and MRV, and a panel of influential leaders speaking on forests and climate change updates from a variety of perspectives. This day-long event will be punctuated by networking opportunities for the social butterflies among us.

Day 8 – 12/5/11
On Day 8, we get down to ‘business,’ by exploring private-sector opportunities, carbon market outlook and strategies, PoAs to NAMAs, and green investment schemes (all hosted by IETA). The biggest event on the books? An intergovernmental dialog between national governments and voluntary carbon market movers and shakers. We’ll be there – will you?

Day 9 – 12/6/11
As (maybe?) the real “work” of the COP starts taking shape, Day 8 is a shorter day of side-events hosted by IETA. On this day, we will immerse ourselves in market linkages (EU ETS, RGGI, California, AU, NZ), the exciting world of nested REDD jurisdictional approaches and then later dive into the crystal-blue waters of the sub-national strategy in Mexico.

Day 10 – 12/7/11
Our selection of Day 10 OSEs includes discussions on SADC opportunities, the UN system for implementation, sustainable forest management, and sub-national approaches. Also, we have highlighted two IETA events on bilateral strategies and post-Kyoto protocol.

Day 11 – 12/8/11
On Day 11, the four OSE’s we’re looking at force audiences to ask themselves the tough questions: what have we accomplished with emissions reductions and what are the legal hurdles ahead? Also, we will take a close look at international carbon finance, from NAMAs to China and beyond.

Day 12 – 12/9/11
On the last day of the COP, as decisions or derision are in full swing in the official proceedings, we will wind down with three events and scale up our coverage of the final plenary. If you’re not into the last minute flurry of negotiating, check out these events: one on the jurisdictional approach in Brazil, one on post-kyoto MRV approaches, and one on REDD+ safeguards and the Green Climate Fund.

Like all good things, our time enjoying Durban (including our time enjoying views of the Indian Ocean from the windows of our conference rooms) must come to an end.

We sincerely hope that this synopsis of our favorite COP 17 side events will help you plan your time in Durban! Best wishes for your last-minute pre-Durban preparations, and we look forward to seeing you at the conference.

Additional resources

Infrastructure: From Shades of Grey to Shades of Green

US President Barack Obama has called for a massive increase in spending to revive our crumblng built infrastructure, but he’s so far failed to mention the equally threatened and far more basic “green infrastructure” that provides our air, water, and food. Ricardo Bayon argues that a little bit of strategic investment here can go a long, long way.

21 September 2011 | Infrastructure: it was like a chorus resonating throughout the entire speech that President Obama gave last week. He spoke of the need to fix aging roads, bridges, schools, just about everything. It was at the same time the solution to the jobs problem, the economy, even competition from China. And yet the President forgot one crucial piece of infrastructure in his statements, the sort of infrastructure that is usually forgotten and often overlooked, infrastructure that is decidedly less grey than the roads, bridges, and schools he wants to re-build, the sort of infrastructure that has been on this planet every since life began: natural infrastructure.

Now it is common for humans to think that infrastructure is only composed of things we design and build. But that is hubris; the sort of hubris that has led us to believe that roads, shopping malls, and farms are worth more than forests, wetlands, and coral reefs. And yet, it is the natural infrastructure that these ecosystems are a part of that has made life on this planet possible. They give us clean air, circulate water, and provide us with food, and shelter. So why do we habitually forget to think about how we are going to finance, restore, and maintain the natural infrastructure on which we all depend?

Why wasn’t there a bold “Green Infrastructure” investment plan to match the President’s bold “Grey Infrastructure” investment plan? Can we not put Americans to work restoring the forests and wetlands that provide us with clean air and clean water? Surely this infrastructure is in as bad a state of disrepair as our roads, our bridges, or our schools? In point of fact, not only are we not “maintaining” the natural infrastructure on which we depend, but we are actually dismantling that infrastructure in order to grow more corn, more soy, and more palm oil. We are literally selling our planet’s life-support systems for parts. Every day hundreds of thousands of acres of natural infrastructure is torn down to make way for more growth, more people.

And what happens when “green” infrastructure makes way for more and more “grey infrastructure”? Just ask the residents of the flooded communities along the Mississippi what happens when the river’s wetlands and floodplains   –the natural infrastructure that was once responsible for controlling floods– are torn down.

It doesn’t have to be that way. The cities of Philadelphia, New York and Rio de Janeiro are a case in point. They have figured out ways of integrating the grey with the green.

The City of Brotherly Love has a problem it shares with many major cities around the world. When it rains or when storms come, water runs off the rooftops and roads (the grey infrastructure) and overwhelms the city’s aging sewer systems. When this happens, the mechanisms designed to clean the sewer water before it is dumped back into the river systems cannot cope with the increased volume of water and are forced to emit “less than clean” water into the local waterways. In addition to being gross and unsanitary, this is one of the major sources of pollution into rivers, not just around Philadelphia, but around any major city you care to name. To deal with this problem, the city of Philadelphia has come up with an ambitious plan it calls its “Green City, Clean Waters” program. The idea behind this plan is to replace the impervious “grey” infrastructure of the city with more natural “green infrastructure” like green roofs, tree-lined streets, wetlands, rain gardens, etc. In this way the water seeps into the ground, is used by plants, and makes its way slowly back into the river systems. Additionally, this green infrastructure will have co-benefits like nicer streets, cooler buildings, and parks for recreation. Better yet, this movement from “grey” to “green” will save the city millions, if not billions of dollars in sewer upgrade costs.

New York City had a drinking problem a decade ago: Its water was dangerously polluted and the city needed to build a multi-billion dollar water treatment plant to keep it clean. Instead, the city chose to spend the money protecting ecosystems upstream in the Hudson river. In doing so, they got the necessary water quality improvements at a fraction of the cost . Quite the bargain.

The story of Rio de Janeiro is actually older, and perhaps even more interesting. Back in the second half of the 19th century, the forests around the city had been cleared for coffee farms and other plantations. As a result, water for the city was suffering. At that time, a visionary leader, Major Manuel Gomes Archer, decided to replant a local forest now called the Tijuca forest. It took decades, but today that forest is a bustling tropical jungle that is widely considered to be the largest urban forest in the world. Not only does that forest help provide the city with better water, but it protects the city from mudslides, erosion, and storms; all while it contributes to the natural beauty of one of the world’s most iconic cities. No amount of grey infrastructure could have delivered that kind of return on investment.

So, as we stand on the cusp of yet another bold and multi-billion dollar investment in infrastructure in this country, perhaps we should take the lessons of Philadelphia, New York and Rio and spend a bit of that money on the restoration and maintenance of the country’s natural infrastructure. Because if we take a monochromatic approach to infrastructure –one that only sees the world in shades of grey– we risk missing out on potential cost savings.   Worse still: we risk making losing investments. After all, without forests, wetlands, coral reefs and other forms of “green” infrastructure, any bridge is truly a bridge to nowhere.

 

Ricardo Bayon is a Partner and co-founder of EKO Asset Management Partners, a new breed of “merchant bank” seeking to influence, encourage, and profit from new and emerging markets for environmental commodities (carbon, water, and biodiversity). Formerly he helped found and was the Director of the Ecosystem Marketplace. he can be reached at [email protected].

How Should Congress Amend the Farm Bill?

Through the Farm Bill, the U.S Department of Agriculture spends roughly $20 billion per year on payments to farmers, with about $5 billion of that delivered through the conservation title.   How should Congress amend the Farm Bill so that payments have a greater ecological impact?   Join the discussion on Ecosystem Commons until September 20.

19 September 2011 | The Ecosystem Commons is an online portal where members of the ecosystem services community can kick around ideas, showcase projects, and track trends.  

Sara Vickerman launched this discussion on the Ecosystem Commons earlier this month.   You can join it here.

The Discussion

The U.S Department of Agriculture spends roughly $20 billion per year on payments to farmers, with about $5 billion of that delivered through the conservation title. It offers the single greatest opportunity for the public to assist private landowners in providing ecosystem services, like clean water, biodiversity and climate regulation.   However, the funds are not invested according to any coherent strategy and the ecological outcomes are largely unknown.        

One proposal is to eliminate the subsidy for corn ethanol.   Adding corn ethanol to gasoline does not contribute to a meaningful reduction to greenhouse gases, causes the price of food to increase, and encourages continued degradation of the Midwestern landscape with heavy applications of fertilizers and pesticides.

Another proposal is to restructure the payments in the conservation title to be more strategic and more focused on ecological outcomes rather than practices.   The potential advantages would be to demonstrate to the public what tangible benefits are gained from the investments and possibly to simplify the delivery.     Some potential unintended consequences could be a disproportionate focus on ecological outcomes that can be easily measured, like water quality improvements, and lack of attention to biodiversity and other services that are difficult to quantify. Another potential downside might be spending too much money on the perfecting of measurement tools relative to the conservation benefits.  

What do you think Congress should do to improve the ecological effectiveness of the Farm Bill?  

Author bio: Sara is the senior director for biodiversity partnerships for Defenders of Wildlife, and director of the Northwest office. She serves on the Oregon Sustainability Board, American Forest Foundation and Willamette Partnership Boards, and advisory committees for the Doris Duke Foundation, Oregon Institute for Natural Resources, and Oregon Solutions. She successfully promoted conservation incentives and sustainability legislation in Oregon, and bills that encourage state agencies and local governments to use markets and payments for ecosystem services. She is also involved in developing recommendations for policy changes at the federal level and is working on metrics for habitat and biodiversity.

Perhaps they could widen the

Perhaps they could widen the corn ethanol subsidy to a biofuels subsidy, with a time limit of ten or twenty years during which the scientific and economic communities could study the outcomes to see if these processes are ecologically and financially feasible. For example, there are studies going on to use switchgrass, Panicum virgatum, native to much of the US, as an alternative to corn. Here’s an article from Scientific American about switchgrass as a biofuel: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=grass-makes-better-etha…

Even though there are many studies showing that corn is not a sustainable biofuel, I’d hesitate to eliminate the subsidy without a grace period or some program to help corn ethanol producers switch to a more viable alternative.
 

Conservation Tenders

Conservation Tenders -conservation leases sold at auction and linked to performance outcomes- have been used in Australia as a mechanism to create the market needed to develop supply & demand curves that allow efficiency analysis. See Dr. Jon Rolfe’s work at Central Queensland University for details. http://cem.cqu.edu.au/FCWViewer/staff.do?Sid=ROLFEJ

Resource-Driven – The

Resource-Driven – The National Assocation of State Conservation Agencies received funding and support from the USDA to evaluate the nation’s conservation delivery system.   In its 2007 report, it recommended that the conservation delivery system reverse its current trend of a program-driven system back to a resource-driven process.   I think this recommendation would be aligned with your mentioned proposal to focus on ecological outcomes.   I think your concerns (unintended consequences) are valid, particularly in the early years, but they could be tempered with some foresight and guidelines.   One consequence of this may be the shift of debate toward the measurements and outcomes rather than programs and dollars that naturally creates silos in politics, administration, legislation, process and implementation.   In the longer term, the ecological outcome approach is really the only viable option if there is a desire to integrate corporate, industry, retail  and government ecoservice policy.   Under the government program system, all the responsibilty falls on the agency and farmer, and other stakeholders have a real hard time participating in a meaningful manner.

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Discussion Now Closed: When Does Stacking Ecosystem Service Payments add Ecological Value?

A well-run business seeks to maximize its earnings by harvesting several income streams from one asset, but that only works if end-users see value in the multitude of products coming at them from one source. Can this strategy be applied to ecosystem services to save the most ecologically valuable pieces of land?   Join the Ecosystem Commons debate before 24 August.

22 August 2011 | The Ecosystem Commons is an online portal where members of the ecosystem services community can kick around ideas, showcase projects, and track trends.   It is managed by the Institute for Natural Resources in collaboration with A Community on Ecosystem Services or ACES, the National Ecosystem Services Partnership or NESP, and many others. This  project is made possible by support from the USDA Forest Service, USDA Office of Environmental Markets, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S. Geological Survey.  

Earlier this month,

The Discussion

Pilot programs for ecosystem services payments and markets are beginning to consider whether to allow stacking—where landowners combine multiple market or mitigation payments for a single management activity on a single property—and if so, how these payments should be handled.  

In theory stacking could provide multiple benefits, including increased revenues for landowners who provide services; better ecosystem services projects than are possible with a single payment; and management across multiple services (a move toward optimizing rather than maximizing).

A panel I moderated at the July Ecosystem Markets Conference in Madison, Wisconsin, explored some of the early stacking efforts. The Willamette Partnership’s Counting on the Environment program has developed an approach that allows grouping projects to sell to multiple markets—essentially when one credit type is sold, the other credit types are reduced by a proportionate amount. The Ohio River Basin Trading Project is beginning work to assess the potential benefits of stacking water quality credits with carbon credits, and the new city of Damascus, Oregon is focused on allowing conservation easements to sell services in ecosystem services markets and stack value.    

While there have been assessments of stacking that consider the economic impacts (Woodward 2010), risks to ecosystem service outcomes (Cooley and Olander 2011), and practitioner views on stacking (Fox 2010); we don’t have good examples of the benefits. Where would stacking result in greater participation and more ecosystem services benefits?  When would stacking allow a different type of project—one that generates greater benefits—to proceed? What do these examples look like?

Author bio:  
Lydia Olander is the Director of the Ecosystem Services Program at Duke University’s Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions. She is helping to develop Duke’s expanding initiative on ecosystem services, coordinating Duke’s Ecosystem Services Working Group, helping to lead the institute’s program on greenhouse gas offsets, directs the Technical Working Group on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases and has previously worked on designing policy for reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD). She spent a year as AAAS Congressional Science and Technology Fellow working with Sen. Joseph Lieberman on environmental and energy issues. She received her doctorate from Stanford University, where she studied nutrient cycling in tropical forests, and has a masters in forest science from Yale University. She has published in professional journals, including Ecosystems, Biogeochemistry, Soil Biology and Biochemistry, Forest Ecology and Management, Earth Interactions, Environmental Research Letters, and Global Environmental Politics.

Comments

These are great questions.

These are great questions. For me, there are two goals for stacking–1) increase landowner participation, and 2) incentivize more wholistic/better restoration and conservation.

For the first, economic goal, this seems most important where you have high-value crops or lands where ecosystem services are having a hard time competing with other land uses (e.g. urban development). I think we need to ask which landowner demographic we are after. If we want to compete with urban development, we may never win. If we want to target those 70% of landowners that want to stay in farming, forestry, or ranching and just need to break even to stay on the land, then I think we can get a lot done. When we think about stacking, we should be thinking about stacking to get the next big pulse of participation (ie 30% of landowners) rather than all landowners.

For the second goal, I’m not sure you need to stack to get here. The Willamette Partnership bet that if you give landowners options of selling multiple, but not quite stacked credits, then that additional set of options would lead to better restoration. We have to see if that plays out to be true or not. We also put eligibility requirements in place. If you want a credit for reducing temperature, then you can’t just plant trees–you need to plant a healthy forest with an understory and a diversity of plant species.

So, I think we should be looking at the multiple places in program design where we can get to our goals. Stacking is one lever. We need to balance the stacking debate with the need to get high levels of certainty into these programs. We’d love to see a better approach, so I really look forward to seeing the examples. Thanks for posting this Lydia!

If we view ecoservices in the

If we view ecoservices  in the broad definition to include grain, lumber, carbon sequestration, water quality, etc.   then ecoservies are already stacked.   Within fields on our farm I produce corn grain, corn stover, carbon seq, water quality, and habitat – but only (the first)    two of those are value-stacked within the economy and government systems.   I am producing a larger stack of ecoservices than the value stream stack  that returns to the land.   So if  society, government, industry, retail, NGOs, etc send out a market signal for the demand of more WQ, Cseq, etc. but do not pay for all the values, then I doubt many land managers will respond to a weak and (perceived) unfair market signal.   If ecoservices are real, then the market has to recognize them as real if they want them produced and the data that they were produced.   I think part of the issue is that the major early players in the ecoservice market are concerned with paying for ecoservices.   The mindset of regulatory policy makers is to direct people to do something without compensation and when this mindset moves into the market place is only wants to ante up a little – perhaps thinking the not being regulated has some innate value that should be universally recognized.   But once the market gets a hold of value, it has no preconceived notions on what should happen, but searches for the value and how people should be compensated for that value.         Now to let the demanders off the hook somewhat, I will add that the values associated with producing  these new ecoservices do not have to be all direct monetary payments, but other economic  values such as market access, participatory benefits, insurance premium reductions, tax breaks, regulatory compliance and resource credits.   But I  think the  bottom line is that if an activity produces an outcomes that has value, it needs to be recognized by the  market and the market will find its price.      By placing these new ecoservice commodities in a box with restrictive parameters related to  permanancy, duplicity and additionality will undervalue these ecoservices relative to other unrestricted commodities to the point that we will only experience bilateral trades within  isolated regional markets that are heavily subsidized by governments and/or non-profit organizations.

Great comments, folks! I’m

Great comments, folks!   I’m learning a lot.

I have been marinating on the “bundle of sticks” concept with regard to  additionality.  

First, let me digress and explain how I’m understanding stacking vs additionality as Lydia has framed this question.   It seems like stacking MIGHT result in additional ecoservice preservation, and especially should in the aggregate as it makes participation in ecosystem markets a more attractive option than other land uses.   However,   for an individual land, stacking might NOT result in additional services, just more funding for the preservation of the same tract as it provides multiple ecoservices.   Am I getting this right?

Anyway, back to the bundle of sticks: The validity of additionality and paying for multiple services  on the same tract rests to some extent on how the ecoservices being transferred are defined.   That is, if aservice is defined very broadly or inclusively (for example, x feet of riparian buffer), then one has to be careful not to re-sell services for those same  lands  that are already included in THAT buffer bundle of sticks (in our area, this would include nitrogen processing, mostly, but in other areas temperature regulation or TSS  might be included in “riparian buffer” transactions).  

Unfortunately, this seems to be leading me to conclude that for the participants in the marketplace, it’s better to define ecoservices narrowly, to maximize future opportunities for additional payments (ecoservices for which payments are not yet available).   As someone with a working knowledge of ecology and the uncertainties of restoration practices, however, I question whether one-off ecoservice transactions can really deliver and add up to preservation of functioning ecosystems.

As noted above, ecosystem

As noted above, ecosystem services by their very nature are stacked.   The challenge here is to disaggregate the services in ways that translate into some monetized value so that it fits into the prevailing economic system.   We probably do not need to be too concerned about double-counting from an ecological perspective, but economists might have a different perspective.

One very interesting movement that is making positive headway is the Salmon Safe program (http://www.salmonsafe.org/).   At the SETAC meetings in Portland (November 2010), in a session on supply-side sustainability, we learned that small wineries have been adopting the land management practicies and undergoing audits to be certified under the Salmon Safe label.   There does not appear to be a strong correlation between having the label and direct monetary benefit in terms of increased sales or  increased pricing — rather, the motivation is “to do the right thing” in terms of managing lands and the connections to waterways.   If this program is representative of other opportunities, then  I think we can be successful in promoting wise stewardship for the sake of wise stewardship even when there is not a direct realization of profit in doing so.
 

Join the Discussion

To read more comments or to post your own, visit the Ecosystem Commons web site.

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Cap-and-Trade Beats Slash-and-Shirk Any Day

 

19 August 2011 | The 2012 US election season is underway, and we all know the basic script.   Democrats will try to make the case that the best way to pull our economy out of the mud is to roll back the Bush tax cuts and funnel the added income into job-creating infrastructure projects, while Republicans will continue to say the economy can free itself if we keep lowering taxes and shrinking government.

To prove their mettle on that front, most Republican presidential candidates have vowed to gut the Environmental Protection Agency – a vow that sitting House members have already started to make good on.   Democrats have limply vowed to defend the agency – primarily on moral grounds.

Neither party really gets it right, because they both – at best – see environmental protection as something we should do – like a bit of housekeeping, akin to trimming the bushes – as opposed to something we must do – like shoring up the foundation, which is what it is.

Both parties, in short, seem oblivious to the fact that our economy depends on our ecology, and that everything we buy, sell, eat, and produce is derived from nature.   If we destroy nature, we destroy our own livelihoods – as people living along the Mississippi River and its tributaries learned all too clearly this past Spring, when decades of poor wetland management exacerbated flooding and cost us billions.

If we don’t protect nature, we lose more than just cuddly animals.   We lose swamps that filter water and regulate flooding, as well as mangroves that protect our coasts, forests that clean our air, and scores of other living resources that deliver ecosystem services.

This is something that true fiscal conservatives have always understood, which is why they spearheaded the development of ecosystem markets that bring the true cost of environmental degradation into our economy.   It was hunters frustrated by dwindling supplies of ducks who first began to advocate for wetland protection, and it was George H W Bush who championed and signed the first cap-and-trade mechanism as part of the Clean Air Act of 1990.   That law put a cap on the amount of sulphur and nitrogen oxides (SOx and NOx) that industry can pump into the air, but it let the private sector identify the most efficient way of meeting that cap.

Then as now, right wingers went apoplectic – predicting everything from rolling blackouts and soaring energy costs to the end of the coal sector and a nationwide recession.   Left wingers had the opposite fear – they believed industry would just “buy its way out” of its clean air obligations, and likened the permits to indulgences.

Both sides were wrong.   The program has helped cut acid rain in half since its inception, and at a cost of just $3 billion per year, which is more than 85% lower than industry projections.   More importantly, it saved local communities more than $122 billion per year in reduced health costs and cleaner lakes and rivers, according to a study by the Journal of Environmental Management.   That’s $40 in savings for every $1 spent – although the EPA prefers the more conservative claim of $30 for every dollar spent.

Either way, the program worked, and it worked because it let government do what government does best, and it let the private sector do what the private sector does best.   Specifically, it let government draw a clear and inviolable line above which emissions dare not rise, and it let the private sector find new and innovative ways of staying below that line, with a financial incentive for those who did the best job.   This same principle drives cap-and-trade-like mechanisms that protect endangered species, promote the preservation of wetlands, and improve water quality.   All of these mechanisms were successfully pioneered in the United States, and all have been taken up elsewhere.

Like cap-and-trade, these programs work because they promote responsible land stewardship in a way that is transparent, efficient, and effective – which is exactly what fiscal conservatives claim to want.   Ecosystem markets funnel money from those who consume or destroy ecosystem services to those who restore or provide them – thus reducing the kind of foggy subsidies that fiscal conservatives claim to abhor.

These are the kinds of programs that environmentalists within the GOP should be championing, and such people do exist.   Jim DiPeso appears to be one of them.   He’s the policy director of a group called Republicans for Environmental Protection, and he recently posted a list of the “10 Biggest Republican Environmental Accomplishments“.   Bush’s Acid Rain Program, however, was not among them.

Sadly, the mainstream of the Republican Party seems more interested in abrogating the government’s constitutional mandate to “promote the general welfare” than in finding fiscally responsible ways preserving our green infrastructure.   If so, they need to abandon their slogan of “cut, cap, and balance” and replace it with something a bit more honest – like “slash, bash, and shirk”.

 

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What Can a Deal in Durban Deliver?

Though COP 17 may not be happening until November, the recent negotiations in Bonn may give clues about what might be achieved in Durban.   Chris Spence of the IISD takes a look at what happened in Bonn and the sort of outcome can be expected in Durban.

This article originally appeared on the IISD/Earth Negotiations Bulletin and is reprinted with permission.   You can view the original here.

30 June 2011 | The recent negotiations in Bonn, Germany, under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) offer clues about what might be achieved at the end-of-year conference in Durban, South Africa.

The latest round of climate change talks in Bonn are over. Weary delegates are back in capitals. Some are probably reflecting on the discussions; others may be trying their best to forget them. The lucky ones are preparing for well-earned vacations with family or friends in July or August. Yet with only one more official negotiating session remaining between now and the opening of the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 17) in Durban in late November, it is worth reviewing what happened in Bonn. As things now stand, what sort of an outcome can we expect in Durban?

Bonn… But Not Forgotten?

The June 2011 Bonn meeting is unlikely to be remembered for either an auspicious start or a memorable end. It began with agenda disputes in the subsidiary bodies on implementation (SBI) and scientific and technological advice (SBSTA), as each tried to digest and address the outcomes from the Cancun Climate Change Conference held last December. Equally, the Bonn meeting hardly ended on a high, with outcomes my colleagues on the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) team characterized as “relatively modest.” According to our ENB experts, “a lot of work [needs] to be done before COP 17” (Read their excellent summary and analysis from Bonn).

The main goal in Bonn was to make progress across a range of topics in order to smooth the path to success in Durban later this year. Much of the direction for the Bonn discussions was provided by the Cancun Agreements, which were adopted in December 2010. The Cancun Agreements contain a variety of decisions ranging from a general recognition of the need for deep cuts in global emissions to specific decisions on new institutions or processes such as the Technology Mechanism, Adaptation Committee and Green Climate Fund. Delegates in Cancun also agreed to extend the mandates of the Ad Hoc Working Groups addressing broader issues under the UNFCCC (AWG-LCA) and the future of the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). Both the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA now have mandates that take them through to COP 17 in Durban.

Taken as a whole, the Cancun outcomes and discussions in Bonn (and an earlier session of the AWGs in Bangkok) suggest that Durban will be judged largely on how it addresses three main topics:

  • agreement on a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol (under which developed countries would take on legally-binding commitments post-2012);
  • progress on a broader, comprehensive agreement that includes all major emitters; and
  • progress in operationalizing new institutions such as the Technology Mechanism and Green Climate Fund.

What are the prospects for success on these three issues in Durban? Below is an assessment of each element as things stand in the aftermath of the June 2011 Bonn meeting.

Will the Kyoto Music Stop?

As I noted in a previous policy update, there has been a growing sense in recent years that negotiators will be unable to agree on a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. The latest Bonn talks provided little evidence to disprove this belief. The merry band that formed back in 1997 and pledged to cut emissions is now shrinking rapidly. Japan, Canada and the Russian Federation have all recently declared that they will not join in a second commitment period under the Protocol. With the US never ratifying, only a diminished group—the EU, Norway, Switzerland and a few others—now appear willing to sign on the dotted line. An agreement involving a smaller group of mostly European countries has been dubbed a “mini-Kyoto” or “Kyotino” by some insiders. However, many observers are asking if it is even worth having a second period if so many industrialized countries are now unwilling to commit. With the first commitment period set to end on 31 December 2012, time is extremely short to negotiate a viable alternative. Based on the recent discussions in Bonn and Bangkok, there is little reason to believe Durban can deliver a major breakthrough. On the other hand, it is not completely out of the question that it could provide clarity on the Protocol’s fate, either by giving it a “decent burial” or by securing a limited second commitment period that preserves Kyoto’s rules and approach for long enough to allow an orderly transition to something else.

Prospects for agreement in Durban: Poor.

Can Durban Seal a Comprehensive New Deal?

Even an ambitious second commitment period under Kyoto will not deliver the type of emissions reductions needed to keep the lid on climate change. Some industrialized countries have been vocal in calling for a comprehensive global agreement that includes all major emitters. Only an ambitious treaty covering all key players could possibly limit global temperature rise to 2 °C or less.

The concern on the part of developing countries is that such a treaty could blur the lines between the obligations of developed and developing countries. Under Kyoto, developed countries undertook to take the lead in combating climate change. This is a condition the South wants honored, and explains why they continue to press hard for a second commitment period.

The result of these two divergent opinions has been a circular argument where some industrialized countries press for a more comprehensive treaty while developing countries insist on the North first taking the lead with ambitious binding targets under Kyoto. Both sides present good arguments, but the different approaches they espouse presents a daunting challenge for the process.

Arguably, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord was the result of this stand off. With neither side willing to “blink” first and risk losing their bargaining power, an alternative “pledge and review” process emerged to fill the gap. Pledge and review is essentially a bottom-up approach whereby any country can voluntarily make any promises it feels are appropriate, with its pledges subject to review later. The pledge and review approach has a simple elegance that appeals to quite a few parties, including the US. However, others criticize it as a “lowest common denominator” approach that would not provide a legally-binding framework and could not guarantee the level of ambition needed to prevent extreme climate change.

So how does the “pledge and review” system affect efforts to achieve a comprehensive agreement? As the ENB team noted in its analysis, there was a sense in Bonn that the US and others who are comfortable with the Copenhagen Accord’s pledge and review approach already have what they want, meaning there is “little incentive to go any further.”

Prospects for agreement in Durban: Poor.

Can Durban Deliver on the Details?

The Cancun Agreements established various institutions and processes under the UNFCCC. Several now need to have their rules finalized and become operational. COP 17 in Durban will be judged in part on whether it can deliver solid outcomes on the Technology Mechanism, Adaptation Committee, Green Climate Fund and Standing Committee on Finance.

One risk in this respect is the insistence by some delegations that “their” particular priority issue must not slip behind others in terms of the progress made in negotiations. The popular refrain of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” sounds fair in theory. However, it is going to be hard to achieve agreement in practice when what’s on the negotiating table literally seems to include almost everything… even sinks (although of the carbon rather than kitchen variety).

In spite of this note of caution, the meeting in Bonn provided a fairly optimistic picture. At this point in time, the prevailing opinion seems to be that Durban could deliver some successes in operationalizing the new institutions and processes established in Cancun.

Prospects for agreement in Durban: Fair.

The Road Goes Ever On?

At this point in time, a gambler would probably be willing to bet that the Durban COP could achieve success in operationalizing at least some of the new institutions and processes agreed in Cancun. However, insiders are far less optimistic on the likelihood that the AWG-KP will conclude its work on a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, or that the AWG-LCA will secure a comprehensive broader agreement. As things currently stand, an outright success for the AWG-LCA or AWG-KP must be considered extremely unlikely at COP 17.

While progress on new institutions in Durban should be warmly welcomed, it must be noted that only an ambitious global agreement could deliver the deep emissions cuts called for by the scientific community. Anything less will certainly commit the world to dangerous anthropogenic interference in our climate.

Of course, Durban will not be the last opportunity to achieve such a breakthrough. The UNFCCC road will continue with many more milestones and “key meetings” in the coming years. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that climate change will not wait indefinitely for negotiators to find a breakthrough. The UNFCCC may already have followed its path for the last 20 years. But its road must not become a never-ending journey.

Chris Spence is the Deputy Director of IISD Reporting Services.
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What’s Wrong With Brazil?

The following article is reproduced with permission from the blog EDF Talks Global Climate. View the original post here.

9 June 2011 | This past week I could have sworn I was back in the 1980s, based on the news coming out of Brazil.

Brazil’s powerful agriculture caucus (bancada ruralista) and Communist Party led the charge in the House of Representatives to pass a bill that, if enacted, would essentially legalize deforestation in vast amounts of land.

And three activists who worked for years to protect forests from illegal logging were killed for their efforts.

Then, yesterday, the Brazilian environmental agency approved the Belo Monte dam – a hydroelectric project so controversial and flawed that the Federal Attorney General’s office brought a series of lawsuits against it, most of which have not been judged, and recommended that it not be licensed.

As someone who works with indigenous and environmental groups in Brazil and has been active in tropical forest policy for years, I find this series of events deeply troubling, and reminiscent of the Brazilian Amazon’s dark past. And these events come at a time when, because of strong pressure on land use from increasing commodity prices, and an expectation that the Congress would revise the 1965 Forest Code, the clearing of trees for expanding farms and cattle ranching in the Amazon rainforest is on the rise, possibly up 30% over last year.

Brazil’s government is at a crossroads – either it can go back to a future of rampant deforestation and frontier chaos, or ahead, to the future of a sustainable and equitable green economy leader, with rule of law, good governance and a secure natural and investment environment. Senate action on the Forest Code over the next few months could spell the difference.

Is Brazil going backward or forward?

This series of events recalls the former status-quo, business-as-usual days when deforestation was accepted – even promoted – as a necessary corollary to development and prosperity.

Those were the days when Brazil was the fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, with about 70% of its emissions caused by clearing forests. At the height of deforestation, the Amazon was losing more than 21,000 km2 – more than 8,000 square miles, about twice the size of Connecticut – of forest a year.

Those were also the days when grassroots environmental and union leaders were killed for working to protect the forest and forest peoples’ rights; prominent activists like rubber tapper and union leader Chico Mendes and Roman Catholic Sister Dorothy Stang were both slain for their efforts to keep forests standing for the sake of communities’ livelihoods and the environment.

Brazil has come a long way since then, particularly in reducing deforestation and altering public perception of it.

Reducing deforestation: Brazil has experienced seven years of almost uninterrupted decreases in deforestation, establishing it as the world leader in greenhouse gas pollution reductions. Between 2006 and 2010, Brazil has reduced Amazon deforestation about two-thirds below the annual average from 1996–2005, reducing about 1 billion tons of greenhouse gas pollution. This was due largely to the 2003 National Plan to Prevent and Control Amazon Deforestation and the subsequent 2009 National Climate Change Policy, in which Brazil committed to reducing deforestation 80% below the 1996–2005 average by 2020.

Social shift against deforestation: Popular opinion on the Amazon has clearly changed – most people want deforestation to stop. Most people also think that murders for hire in land conflicts should be punished – and in cases when international spotlights shone on Amazon assassinations, like Chico Mendes and Sister Dorothy Stang, it seemed as though the rule of law could be taking hold.

But despite these encouraging environmental strides, and even aside from the passage of the explicitly anti-environment bill, three disturbing themes of the past couple weeks are calling into question just how permanent Brazil’s environmental progress is:

1. Lethal intolerance of activists who protect forests
Jos Claudio Ribeiro da Silva, a Brazil nut gatherer and forest defender, was slain the morning of the Forest Code vote with his wife Maria do Esp­rito Santo in Nova Ipixuna, in Par¡ state in the Brazilian Amazon. The couple had long resisted illegal logging and forest clearing for smelters for pig iron (made from iron ore and charcoal and used for manufacturing steel) and had received numerous death threats. In a public lecture in November 2010 Jos© Claudio said, recalling slain grassroots environmental leaders Chico Mendes (1988) and Sister Dorothy Stang (2005), “What they did to Chico Mendes and Sister Dorothy, they want to do to me.”
Then, on Friday, May 27th small-scale farmer leader Adelino Ramos was shot dead in Vista Alegre do Abun£, in Rondonia state. Ramos had received death threats for denouncing illegal logging in the region.
And on Saturday May 28th, the body of a small-scale farmer Eremilton Pereira dos Santos, was found shot to death about 7 km away from where Jos Claudio and Maria were killed. Police say they do not know whether these three killings are related, but representatives of the Pastoral Land Commission surmise that Eremilton may have witnessed the earlier killings.
2. Heavy influence of the Agriculture Caucus on Congress’s Forest Code debate 
Listening to the Forest Code debate in the Brazilian Congress so far is about as informative and edifying as listening to the U.S. Congress talk about climate change – that is, to say, not very.
It is commonly agreed within Brazil that the 1965 Forest Code needs revision and updating. But Communist Party representative and author of the just-passed bill Aldo Rebelo didn’t focus on looking at other solutions, like using taxes, credit or a carbon market to incentivize farmers to keep forests standing or restore past deforestation.
The Rebelo proposal instead falsely supposes that forests are inherently, as M¡rcio Santilli of the Instituto Socioambiental put it, “nothing more than ‘anti-food'” – that more forest means less agriculture, less growth and less development. Rebelo’s bill, and its ultimate success, capitalized on the erroneous, purely ideological notion that environmental regulation is a foreign plot designed to keep Brazilian agriculture from competing with U.S. agriculture.
The agriculture caucus leadership has a sense of entitlement and cronyism about it that can get ugly. During the discussion before the vote on Tuesday, former Environment Minister and current Congressman Jos Sarney Filho made a motion in the House to ask for the federal police to investigate the killing of Ribeiro and his wife – and was met with boos from the agriculture caucus.
Brazil’s farmers deserve better political representation than this. I’ve met farmers and ranchers across the Amazon who have worked hard to build productive, competitive businesses, and are proud that they’re in compliance with the current law. These voices are not being heard in this debate, and if the Rebelo bill is enacted, they will be penalized for their efforts, while the scofflaws will be rewarded.
3. Surge in deforestation
In mid-May, we learned that deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon in March and April may have spiked dramatically over those same months last year, and Brazil’s Environment Ministry and many researchers hold that expectations that the Congress would weaken forest protection requirements in the Forest Code are contributing to the increase. Preliminary reports from Brazil’s National Space Research Agency (INPE) now suggest that deforestation has increased about 30% from last year, which is also widely attributed to the anticipation of the approval of the new Forest Code.

So, what does all this mean for Brazil?

EDF believes that the brutal killings, the influence of the agriculture caucus, the rapidly increasing deforestation, and the House vote to cripple Brazil’s environmental legislation, must be met with a solid government response for Brazil to maintain its international leadership on the environment. And we’re not the only ones calling for action at this critical juncture.

The Forest Code changes were opposed by Brazil’s major national scientific associations – the Brazilian Academy of Sciences and the Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science – as well as numerous forestry sector trade associations and ten former Environment Ministers. The Ministers wrote in a letter to President Dilma Rousseff:

“We understand… that history has reserved for our times… above all, the opportunity to lead a great collective effort for Brazil to proceed on its pathway as a nation that develops with social justice and environmental sustainability.”

And the range of interests that came together to support forest protect protection – the scientific community, the National Council of Brazilian Bishops, the national association of attorneys, small farmers’ organizations and environmentalists — are coming together to provide the efforts needed to produce balanced and fair revisions to the Forest Code.

If enacted, the House language would open up wholesale entire categories of land that are now protected, and could completely roll back the progress Brazil has made in the last seven years by:

  • Giving amnesty for past illegal deforestation
  • Opening up to deforestation hundreds of thousands of acres of currently protected forests along watercourses, on steep slopes and hilltops and mangrove swamps
  • Making virtually any regulation against forest clearance unenforceable, by inter alia, allowing illegal deforestation to be compensated with replanting over a twenty year period.

Justification for change in Forest Code “patently false”

The most common justification for Congressional support for the bill – that environmental regulation has shackled Brazil’s development and growth of agriculture – is patently false. The Communist Party’s Rebelo and his large landholder and rancher allies also justified the measure in the name of small farmers burdened with environmental restrictions.

The fact is, since 2003, Brazil’s economy has grown steadily and robustly and some 25 million people escaped poverty, all while Amazon deforestation declined two-thirds below the average of the previous decade. In recent years, Brazil has become the world’s largest exporter of beef, chicken and sugar, and the second biggest exporter of soy.

And major small farmers’ organizations actually opposed the bill. The Amazon has enormous potential for growth through intensification – some 80% of the deforested land in the Amazon is extremely low-yield cattle pasture (less than one head per hectare). Small farmers are poor because they lack access to credit, technology and technical assistance, not because of environmental regulation, as Rebelo claims.

World watching Brazil as Forest Code moves to Senate, President

The House passage of the Forest Code is certainly not the end of this story.

The bill now goes to Brazil’s Senate, which could spend months debating it. (Before last week’s passage of the bill, the House had been debating the Forest Code since 2009). The rapporteur for the bill, Senator Jorge Viana, has an outstanding record on forest protection and sustainable development as former governor of Acre state. If the Senate makes any changes, the bill goes back to the House, and so on, until the bill’s language is agreed. The bill is then sent to President Rousseff, who has the option to veto portions of the bill or the entire bill.

During Rousseff’s presidential campaign last fall, she pledged to reduce deforestation in the Amazon by 80 percent and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about 39 percent by 2020. Reuters quotes the then-candidate saying, in regards to these pledges from her environmental platform:

“I will keep those promises.”

President Rousseff and the Senate have — and should grab — the opportunity to preserve Brazil’s leadership on sustainable development and signal investors that they can count on rule of law and a stable investment environment in a plethora of sustainable, green economy alternatives from biofuels, to sustainable forestry and forest carbon credits.

However, if the bill should pass the Senate and be enacted as currently written, it could, over time, erase Brazil’s gains in controlling Amazon deforestation, undermine the considerable international stature the country gained through its environmental leadership, and foreclose Brazil’s enormous green growth potential.

With Brazil set to host the Rio +20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development next year, the world will be watching the Senate and President closely.

Mississippi Learning:
Flood the Plains and Spare the Disaster?

12 May 2011 | The Mississippi River spared Elvis Presley’s old haunts when it breached its banks at Memphis.

“Graceland is safe,” said Bob Nations Jr., director of the Shelby County Emergency Management Agency, in an interview with the Associated Press.

“We would charge hell with a water pistol to keep it that way,” he added, “And I’d be willing to lead the charge.”

Unfortunately, that won’t help all the farms and towns and businesses that were engulfed along the river’s 2000 miles.  Fixing them will cost billions of dollars – a sum that has already sparked outcry over the cost to taxpayers and the wisdom of building in floodplains.

Such critiques are well-taken, but they skirt the real lessons of this catastrophe: namely, that man is a part of nature; that nature delivers ecosystem services that support our economy in ways most of us take for granted; and that we’d all benefit from factoring the value of these services and the true cost of their degradation into our economic decisions.  Ecosystem markets can play a key role in helping us do that.

Wetlands, for example, aren’t just spillways that give water a place to go when the river bloats beyond its capacity.  These bogs and swamps also capture carbon, filter water, and provide shelter for migrating birds, baby fish, and other aquatic animals.  We’ve drained most of them over the past 150 years to make way for villages and farms – many of which are marginally productive and costly to maintain.

That cost, however, is often hidden – or passed on to people downstream – while the benefits are tangible and easy to identify.  That began to change in the second half of the last century, with the emergence of systems theory, ecological economics, and environmental finance.  One study published shortly before last year’s Deepwater Horizon debacle pegged the value of the Mississippi River Delta’s ecosystem services at between $330 billion and $1.3 trillion.

Flood a Farm or Feed a Wetland?

When the Army Corps of Engineers blew up man-made levees to save the town of Cairo, Illinois, they flooded low-lying farms with tons of sludge and sand, rendering them useless for years to come.  A wetland would have absorbed the deluge and then slowly released clean water back into the river – thus saving clean-up costs downstream and in the Gulf of Mexico.  Moreover, it would do this continuously over the decades, and not just during catastrophic years like the one we’re experiencing now.

To be fair, floods like this one would likely overwhelm even the most extensive natural wetland system, but that doesn’t change the fact that, over the long haul, much of the developed land along the Mississippi would be more valuable in its natural state.  As natural wetland, it would absorb water when the river bloats; then it would filter that water, sprout grasses, and feed bogs that capture carbon.  Some would argue that it would also be prettier to look at and certainly more fun to play in than it currently is.

In ecosystem service terms, this means it would provide “flood control”, “water filtration”, “carbon sequestration”, “scenic beauty”, and “recreation”.  All of these services have economic value, and the challenge now is not only to quantify that value, but to show people that it’s in their interest to pay for it.

The US Clean Water Act addressed that issue by placing tight controls on the destruction of wetlands and mandating that any new development lead to “no net loss” of important wetlands – usually interpreted to mean those that are part of a viable watershed system.  This provision for “no net loss” led to the practice of mitigation banking, which encourages developers to proactively rescue soggy farms and return them to their natural state in the hope of selling credits to nearby developers whose activities destroy or degrade wetlands.  The net result should, in theory, be a gradual restoration of those wetlands that deliver the most value.

Army Corps has the Right Idea

The Army Corps of Engineers issues the permits that govern mitigation banking, and this year it also aims to win approval for a new plan that would let more water go where it wants to go by promoting the use of natural floodplains.

“Whenever possible, the best way to manage floods is with a natural floodplain,” said Terrence “Rock” Salt, the US Army’s deputy assistant secretary overseeing the Corps of Engineers’ water-resource policy, in a Wall Street Journal story earlier this week.

The Corps has already begun to implement the plan, but bringing it to scale may require a new approach to mitigation banking – one based not on the foundation of “no net loss”, but instead based on the value of restored ecosystem services.

Payments for Ecosystem Services

There’s plenty of evidence to support the contention that better land stewardship is, in the long term, more economical than the status quo; there are also scores of mechanisms for rewarding that stewardship. Fishermen in the Gulf of Mexico, for example, have suffered because fertilizers from farms all along the Mississippi River and its tributaries are accumulating there, and water trading programs are already underway that reward farmers who reduce the runoff into rivers, lakes, and streams.

Other emerging payment mechanisms promote the restoration not only of  wetlands, but also of forests and other living ecosystems, as well as habitat supporting endangered species, and then enticing those who either benefit from these services or contribute to their destruction to instead pay for their upkeep.

These mechanisms promote healthy rivers, streams, and lakes by creating a financial incentive for practicing good stewardship of the watershed surrounding them.

The City of New York offers a prime example.  Faced with the prospect of spending nearly $10 billion on a new filtration plant or paying landowners in the surrounding Catskill Mountains to maintain the watershed, they chose to pay the landowners.  The experiment has saved the city billions, and in the process yielded lessons for similar programs now being implemented across Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Where Does the Money Come From?

Mitigation banking is driven by private demand for restoration.  It exists outside the sphere of federal or non-profit grant funding, and is a cost of doing business for developers.  As a result, it only happens where houses, roads, and factories are being built.

But our nation’s green infrastructure – like its built infrastructure – is suffering even in places where no new development is underway. Indeed, some of the places most in need of green restoration are those where new development is receding, and much of the flooding taking place along the Mississippi stems from a lack of ecosystem services upstream. What’s more, some of the worst flooding is taking place in tributaries far removed from the Mississippi itself, in drained marshes that could prove prime for wetland development.

It makes sense for those who benefit the most from improvements to green infrastructure to also bear their share of the cost, but in the end, we all benefit.  Therefore, we should be exploring innovative financing mechanisms that involve a combination of private and public funding, as well as a combination of private and public service providers.

Additional resources

Roundtable Hopes Inclusiveness Will Lead to Cohesion in New Zealand and Australia

Cash-strapped governments around the world are turning to mechanisms that preserve endangered species by incorporating the cost of habitat destruction into the cost of development. The Environmental Law Roundtable of Australia and New Zealand (ELRANZ) is building policy from the ground-up by making sure everyone is involved.

27 April 2011 | Australia’s states and territories have been experimenting with market-like mechanisms that preserve biodiversity for years. Southern Australia’s BushBroker/Tender programs, for example, provide enduring and active examples of effective innovation, while other states have initiated pilot programs that test the effectiveness of mitigation banking in different regions.

Indeed, every Australian state and territory has either implemented policy on mitigation banking or is drafting it, and now the federal government is following suit.

But the feds find themselves in the unenviable position of having to synchronize policies that have evolved in isolation – something that can either elevate us all to agreed-upon best practices or drive us down to the lowest common denominator.

Australia’s National Environmental Law Association (NELA) is aiming for the high road, and it wants to include neighboring New Zealand as well.  That’s why NELA teamed up with New Zealand’s Resource Management Law Association (RMLA) to launch the Environmental Law Roundtable of Australia and New Zealand (ELRANZ) in 2008.

One of its first tasks was to publish a manual that provides resources and sample approaches to building on-the-ground projects, saying “Within the environment and planning law and policy disciplines, there is a need for raising awareness of best practice facilitation, creative visioning, meaningful stakeholder participation and other consensus building techniques.”

Since then, ELRANZ has aimed to engage a full range of stakeholders in the policy development process in both Australia and New Zealand.  Last year, it became an important component of NELA’s National Conference in Canberra – thanks largely to support from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN).

The Canberra conference helped ELRANZ push the concept of biodiversity banking into the public eye – something that convener John Hayden hoped would contribute to the harmonization of policies across both countries and a model valuable to the IUCN and others.

From Many One: Stakeholder Involvement

ELRANZ isn’t so much promoting national policies in either New Zealand or Australia, but rather aiming to improve cohesion between states’ operations and encouraging the development of more efficient and effective offset systems and markets across the two countries.

These programs aim to engage a full range of stakeholders, which allows Australia to recognize many potential functions and roles for a national-level policy. This is arguably occurring earlier in schemes’ development than witnessed elsewhere and lends distinct optimism for emerging policy.

If the collaborative processes such as ELRANZ and its outcomes are allowed to translate up into real policy results, then a mature, comprehensive and effective national-level Australian policy could be expected. Such a responsive, progressive policy has the potential to move Australian industries forward more quickly than previously seen elsewhere. Stakeholders are capitalizing on opportunities to learn from other schemes where policy has taken time to develop and full benefits have been delayed by policy latency.

Building on the potential from getting the Round Table participants ‘round the table’, the ELRANZ session in Canberra brought to light the issues a unified policy would need to address. Improved cohesion and efficiency is desired, and this became even clearer when the many perspectives present at the Round Table had a chance to express why a national policy is desirable, drawing on their varying experiences.

Those interacting with offsetting in a legal capacity are pursuing national policy that improves legislative equity between jurisdictions, streamlining case law. Environmental resource managers and consultants wanted to see a policy supporting practical applications and facilitating inter-regional trading.

Aiming High

Despite extensive interest, even the established schemes of the United States are still exploring and piloting platforms for trading offsets between regions, making Australia’s inter-regional interest potentially ambitious. Round Table participants that actively pursuing offsets professionally, require policy that avoid the inefficiencies of requiring multiple offsets for project that impact both state and federally protected values, or cross federal and state lines. Such practical concerns give policy makers real issues to address but most importantly provide insight into how to achieve truly functional policy. While inter-regional trading remains an evolving process internationally, Australian policy may be well positioned to offer progress for addressing this.

One of the largest entities with stakes in the shape of national policy is the Department of Defense, represented at the Round Table.  As one of the nation’s biggest landholders, the Department is placed to be a major component of offset supply and demand, even if most trades remain internal. Most importantly, the Department expects national policy to offer much needed reassurance that offsetting work they do ‘counts’ – both economically and for reputational relationships with the community. Without it, this potentially significant player in the offset market could remain detrimentally dormant, hamstringed by operations spanning state and federal geographic boundaries. In this regard, the policy needs expressed at the ELRANZ most of all reflect the desire for mitigation and offsetting to take full advantage of economies of scale and wider-scale planning and achieve optimal efficiency.

Broader scale policy issues were also prominent: a definitive qualification regarding what is and is not acceptable as an offset and establishing a common language amongst the variations current stakeholders are communicating across. If the ideas and opinions of the Round Table are some indication of the form policy may take, then these are points to take note of. Some reflect well-established international trends, such as the need for clear definition and entrenchment of offsets being like-for-like. Representatives present used terms such as ecological lift, net environmental benefit and additionally in relation to how an offset should be quantified.

Formalizing values or areas not open to offsetting was an important issue for a number of stakeholders. This no-go area idea generates much discussion in both New Zealand and Australia, but interestingly is rarely a significant component of the overseas policies both countries look towards as examples. Very real concerns for preventing ‘commercial trade-offs’ parallels this, and is such strong a sentiment in the region that it is hard to imagine a policy neglecting to directly consider this. Therefore the no-go-area aspect of offset policy may be one that the Australasian region pioneers for international policy best practice.

The mitigation hierarchy is one of the most notable components of international best practice. Round Table agreement was widespread regarding the necessity for strict adherence to achieve a legitimate offset. Opinions were more varied when talk turned to specifically how the sequence should be followed and actions selected. Legal representatives questioned the strength of current obligations to follow the sequence. They called for clarity in how such decisions are made, moving from one step to another. Principles of maximal feasibility and economic analysis were amongst those discussed. The urgent need for national guidelines and clearer policy were the only consensus observable. Without this clarity offsetting and offset policy expanding would largely falter economically. In combination with concerns for ‘avoid only’ areas, it will not be enough for mitigation hierarchy policy to stop at requiring the sequence be followed. It must establish a strong, transparent decision-making process to be effective.

Participants agreed that such macro-level, overall ideas appear well established – it was now time to address more specific issues such as metrics and national guidelines. These topics generated the most interest, being what most participants had hoped to gain insight on from the event. Even with only tabling these aspects at the Round Table, to many it was the networks, connections and exchanges of ideas possible after discussions closed provided the most fertile sources for progress.

Stakeholder and Government

The Round Table discussions are an interesting measure of the pace the market is moving. It indicates considerable momentum present across Australia and New Zealand. National-level policy discussions timely and stakeholders are showing they are willing and able to engage on this level.  From the Round Table the contribution of stakeholders emerges clearly in many regards. Equally highlighted is the far less clear-cut role for government and legislation.

Of the issues raised during the Round Table none divided opinion more notably than the role of government and issues of liquidity. Private-sector representatives presented achieving adequate levels of market liquidity as the major issue to overcome. They highlighted that if only a few trades occur, then the industry will remain small and weak and the advantages of the market will remain elusive. Liquidity problems may be a result of the unit traded – the design of the credit. Australia most advanced trading system is in the state of Victoria where their smaller variety of more well defined ecosystems (compared to areas such as Queensland and New Zealand) has lead some participants to question the reliability of assuming comparative success in other regions through applying the Victorian model. Instead perhaps larger credit markets (such as Queensland) require a more tightly defined unit or credit, where the smaller Victoria market can focus on operating under a tight process of measurement instead (such as the Habitat Hectares approach currently in use). Naturally, these different approaches suggest differences in trading, scientific weighting and systems’ economics which are held as highly important considerations by the stakeholders present, seemly irrespective of any industry or perspective they represented.

Economic concerns were raised again regarding offset supply, especially by rural landowners who are optimally positioned to conduct conservation and generate offsets and credits. Some suggested that government could have a central role here, supporting initiatives around  ‘local champions’ and other bottom-up representatives that foster participation. Alternatively, it was suggested that positive examples by ‘big business’ would act as powerful incentives. Others however felt a business presence could be deterring. This debate over the role of business characterized the afternoon’s discussions.

The importance of incorporating biodiversity values into land prices was one point of concurrence, acknowledged as an important mechanism to generate supply by creating economic incentives, sending market signals to rural landowners, and providing tangible evidence of the benefits available from biodiversity conservation.

Michelle Gain of (Project Manager, Institute for Sustainable Resources, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia) drew on experience in the United States to demonstrate the potential of the entrepreneurial sector. She argued the active fostering of entrepreneurship is the absent key to bolstering Australian markets and filling these gaps the Round Table had expressed. This is because entrepreneurship is able to generate considerable private investment to drive offsetting markets, as financial incentives are created and the government is able to take the role of regulator not controller.

Such regulatory (rather than directory) role for government was not universally supported by the Round Table, notably questioned by public conservation sectors. One concern was that private investment through entrepreneurship makes enforcement and monitoring more challenging. Secondly, the maintenance of rights and engagement with rural landowners and their communities could be jeopardized. Such an approach might not align easily with the types of social concerns within Australia that some participants represented. Debate continued with the concept of ‘critical mass’: if entrepreneurship could grow the market to a suitable size, enforcement and monitoring costs and logistics are expected to ease and negate such cost-related disadvantages. Some suggested this could even be turned to an advantage.

With the afternoon drawing to a close the role of entrepreneurship and government remained an exposed yet unresolved topic, highlighting the complexity of liquidity issues and divides that remain between stakeholders. Despite the drive and capacity to develop policies of national and international standards, remaining debates indicate that ‘one policy does not a system make’. Australia’s maturity and awareness at one level may be overshadowed by the complex and recurring business versus government debate. Stakeholder engagement can only offer many things that Australia is well positioned to take advantage of, but a silver bullet is not one of them. Without overshadowing continued momentum and optimism, this was the take home message that participants were only too willing to recognize.

Looking to the Future

The conference and the continued involvement of stakeholders gives NELA and ELRANZ valuable insight into the formation of the policy paper about offsets. This is the value that this type of organization can provide. Bringing together perspectives from multiple sectors, the organization can provide government representatives with a well-rounded policy recommendation, with the hope of improved, inclusive biodiversity and offsetting policy firmly in the sights.

The paper and the processes it has pioneered in Australia will also provide non-governmental stakeholders with invaluable information and experience to form on-the-ground projects and take environmental markets in Australia and New Zealand towards a positive, and hopefully progressive, future industry.

Additional resources

What Part of “No Net Loss” Does Alberta Not Understand?

The Canadian province of Alberta is chopping up its countryside to extract valuable oilsands, and its longstanding wetland policy of “no net loss” means that oil companies should be offsetting the damage by restoring wetlands across the province.   That policy, however, only applies to populated areas — leaving most of the province’s territory unprotected.

18 April 2011 | “Wetlands are some of the world’s most important ecosystems by virtue of their diverse functions,” says the Water Policy website of the Canadian province of Alberta, a state that has had an interim policy emphasizing ‘no net-loss’ since 1993.

But recent events make it clear that the government still emphasizes tangible money over the intangible – but economically valuable – ecosystem services that wetlands provide.

When the development of oil sands expanded, the government decided to re-evaluate its policy and determined that it had one important distinction that made it pretty much un-enforceable when it came to oil sand development.   The interim policy only applied to settled areas, or the ‘White’ zone, not to the vast amount of Crown (public) lands in Alberta which account for approximately 60% of the province, or the ‘Green’ zone.

Recognizing that the ‘green’ zone would be particularly threatened with the development of oil sands, the province formed the Wetland Policy Project team in 2005 to develop recommendations for wetland policy.   During the development of its recommendations, the team consulted with the government, NGOs and industry.   The team also solicited feedback from interested stakeholders to inform their final recommendations.

(By the way: there will be no protection of ‘Green’ zone wetlands until new regulations come out—projected to be 2011 or 2012.   Well, actually there will not be much after that either.   Read on.)

In 2008, the team submitted its recommendations to the Board of Directors of the Alberta Water Council.   Just like the policy website, the recommendations point out the benefits that wetlands provide.

In addition, the recommendations highlight the necessity of a wetland policy: “The scale of wetland loss across Alberta is only partially understood, but is estimated to be significant, with 64 per cent of wetlands lost to date in the White Area, and current annual loss estimated at between 0.3 per cent and 0.5 per cent of remaining wetland area.   The scale of wetland loss or impacts in the Green Area is unknown, but has likely increased due to development.”

The recommendations included a policy of no-net loss and Wetland Mitigation Decision Framework which went from avoidance to compensation.

At that point, environmentalists probably breathed a sigh of relief.   But that didn’t last very long.   Following the release of the recommendations, team members were given until September to gain approval from their sector.

Of the 20 sectors, 2 submitted letters of non-consensus.   These dissenters represent economic interest in the development of the vast oil sands resources.   Both opposed the policy of ‘no-net loss,’ arguing for more flexibility; they claimed that a strict policy would cost billions and inhibit economic development.

The letters, both dated in 30 July 2008, pretty much suggest taking out all enforcement power from the recommendations—and include some interesting logic to back that up.   Both non-consensus letters, one each from the Alberta Chamber of Resources and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), ask that the wording be changed from “will” to “may” in referencing compensation “to allow flexibility and appropriate discussions to take place…”

In discussing the no-net loss, the Chamber quotes the recommendation’s figures regarding cost.   They say that in the Green Zone companies should be allowed to have a “net-loss of wetlands” because “the Green Zone has not experienced the high historic loss of wetlands and, therefore, has a higher resiliency to wetland loss…”

Where to begin with this logic… Regardless of where it occurs, wetland loss has detrimental effects on the health of the ecosystem.   Loss of wetlands is associated with a decline in water quality, flood mitigation, and more.   Economic values of wetlands reported in global TEEB report (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity) ranged from $900/ha to tens of thousands of dollars per hectare.

CAPP’s letter contains much of the Chamber’s arguments along with a few not-so-logical additions: “Not only will oil sands mining proponents be faced with the high cost of purchasing land for compensation, they will also bear the restoration and ongoing monitoring/maintenance costs for these projects.”

They then go on to state the costs: $170 to $560 million at 1:1 ratio.   At 800km ² and $170 million, that translates to $212,500/km (or $860/acre).     If they think that is expensive, they apparently haven’t checked out the costs of US wetlands credits which sell for $1,500 to $600,000 per acre.

Then there is the icing on the logic cake.   CAPP describes how the development of oilsands mainly impacts peat lands.   Since they are impossible to restore, CAPP says they would have to be replaced with an alternative wetland restoration/creation.   And here is the kicker: since the oil companies have destroyed the irreplaceable, replacing it with unlike wetlands “undermin(es) the ecological rational for the no net loss paradigm altogether.”

Wait… lets back up a second.   What about a principle of go/no-go?   AKA: the resources that cannot be replaced should not be impacted in the first place.

Instead, CAPP is basically telling the people of Alberta that they will lose their wetlands when oil companies develop oil sands (earning billions) and that these oil companies are not going to pay for their restoration.

The Non-Governmental Organization caucus was the only member to respond to these letters (of non-consensus—though they were most likely sharing the feelings of the rest of the group:

“We are disappointed by the positions and revised approaches being advanced in the non-consensus letters…which would essentially reduce the policy to discretionary guidelines.”

And then the letter continues:   “The positions advanced by ACR and CAPP put us in a difficult position.   We made numerous compromises on fundamental issues important to our caucus.   We trust that the GOA, as the steward of the final policy, is aware that all parties have made compromises and that it would be inappropriate to re-open these issues.   Keeping with the intent of the consensus approach, we stand by our original recommendation in June that the Wetland Policy and implementation plan presented to the AWC should be advanced to the GOA for adoption and implementation.”

What they say makes sense.   It is not like the recommendations came out of nowhere; they were derived from three years of consultation and discussion, resulting in the best regulations everyone could agree on.   Of course the government is going to agree.

And they showed signs of agreement when they released a 47-page report on how the government was going to manage oil sand development in February 2009.

“When it comes to Alberta’s oil sands, we believe Canada can be a leader in finding innovative ways to ensure both economic growth and greater environmental protection,” said Treasury Board President Lloyd Snelgrove, referencing the plan.   The environmental protection part, according to the report, would include an offset program to support biodiversity, wetland and management objectives.

Then in August 2010, in response to accusations that they were not being environmentally responsible, the government announced plans to set aside 20% or more of the Alberta oil sands region for conservation.   “There will be a change in the acreage that’s under conservation,” said Alberta Sustainable Resource Development Minister Mel Knight.

But apparently that small glimmer of hope was all environmentalists were going to get.
     
The wetland policy, previewed in November 2010 (a full two years after the recommendations were submitted), sided with economics over the environment, allowing for a GREAT amount of flexibility when it comes to wetland mitigation.

Environment Minister Rob Renner announced a ‘wetland policy intent’ that they would not adopt a strict ‘no net loss’ goal, but instead go for a more flexible approach. The Calgary Herald reported “the province is now headed toward a system where wetlands are rated for their importance (based on factors such as location or biodiversity) and then creative penalties or exchanges can be made. It still may be that a company creates a new wetland, but it won’t happen in every case.”

The CAPP’s president David Collyer downplays industry influence on the decision: “I certainly don’t accept the view that the government has adopted industry’s recommendations.”   The provincial government expects to finalize wetlands policy in 2011 or 2012.

Not surprisingly (and with every right), environmentalists from Canada and the U.S. are not happy—and they are responding.

“The announcement further erodes public trust in government’s ability to manage oilsands impacts at a time when Albertans and the international community are seeking leadership,” says Terra Simieritsch of the Pembina Institute, a Canadian based research institution.

She adds that the government is blindly accepting the oil industries cost estimates, rather than the so-far undisputed numbers from the Alberta Wilderness Association, which say it would cost only 50 cents per barrel of oil produced from oilsands.
“At a time when 83% of Alberta’s business leaders…think that ‘Alberta’s business interests have been damaged by our global reputation on environmental stewardship,’ it’s clear that pandering to oil sands industry has economic as well as environmental repercussions,” Simieritsch concludes.

Then, in March of this year, the U.S.-based Pew Environment Group released a report that emphasizes the importance of Canada’s boreal forests not just to Canada, but to the world. It turns out that these wetlands and forests across the northern half of Canada store 197 million acres of surface fresh water AND at least 147 billion tons of carbon.

“Without prompt action, Canada may miss the opportunity to protect this global treasure,” said an international science panel in a letter to Prime Minister Stephen Harper on March 16.

The report estimates the value of climate mitigation and ecosystem services from the boreal at $700 billion annually. The oil sands industry has estimated that development of oil sands in Alberta would bring in about $11-16.5 billion/year (this includes industry investment in oil sands development and expected government revenue from income tax, royalties, corporate tax, etc).

In the report, Alberta’s oilsands get “special attention for destruction of wetlands, lowering water tables and generating contaminates that could have serious downstream impacts.”

Dr. Jeff Wells, the lead researcher on the Pew report, notes: “In the midst of a growing global water crisis, Canada has the opportunity and extraordinary responsibility to protect the globally-significant boreal and its pristine fresh water. It’s a chance that Canada, on behalf of the entire world, cannot afford to miss.”

Now, Alberta just has to wait to see what their government will do next.   Remember, the regulations are not even out yet.   Maybe we will all be surprised and the new regulations contain enforcement power for protecting wetlands.   But we’re not holding our breath.

Mississippi Learning:Flood the Plains and Spare the Disaster?

12 May 2011 | The Mississippi River spared Elvis Presley’s old haunts when it breached its banks at Memphis.

“Graceland is safe,” said Bob Nations Jr., director of the Shelby County Emergency Management Agency, in an interview with the Associated Press.

“We would charge hell with a water pistol to keep it that way,” he added, “And I’d be willing to lead the charge.”

Unfortunately, that won’t help all the farms and towns and businesses that were engulfed along the river’s 2000 miles.  Fixing them will cost billions of dollars – a sum that has already sparked outcry over the cost to taxpayers and the wisdom of building in floodplains.

Such critiques are well-taken, but they skirt the real lessons of this catastrophe: namely, that man is a part of nature; that nature delivers ecosystem services that support our economy in ways most of us take for granted; and that we’d all benefit from factoring the value of these services and the true cost of their degradation into our economic decisions.  Ecosystem markets can play a key role in helping us do that.

Wetlands, for example, aren’t just spillways that give water a place to go when the river bloats beyond its capacity.  These bogs and swamps also capture carbon, filter water, and provide shelter for migrating birds, baby fish, and other aquatic animals.  We’ve drained most of them over the past 150 years to make way for villages and farms – many of which are marginally productive and costly to maintain.

That cost, however, is often hidden – or passed on to people downstream – while the benefits are tangible and easy to identify.  That began to change in the second half of the last century, with the emergence of systems theory, ecological economics, and environmental finance.  One study published shortly before last year’s Deepwater Horizon debacle pegged the value of the Mississippi River Delta’s ecosystem services at between $330 billion and $1.3 trillion.

Flood a Farm or Feed a Wetland?

When the Army Corps of Engineers blew up man-made levees to save the town of Cairo, Illinois, they flooded low-lying farms with tons of sludge and sand, rendering them useless for years to come.  A wetland would have absorbed the deluge and then slowly released clean water back into the river – thus saving clean-up costs downstream and in the Gulf of Mexico.  Moreover, it would do this continuously over the decades, and not just during catastrophic years like the one we’re experiencing now.

To be fair, floods like this one would likely overwhelm even the most extensive natural wetland system, but that doesn’t change the fact that, over the long haul, much of the developed land along the Mississippi would be more valuable in its natural state.  As natural wetland, it would absorb water when the river bloats; then it would filter that water, sprout grasses, and feed bogs that capture carbon.  Some would argue that it would also be prettier to look at and certainly more fun to play in than it currently is.

In ecosystem service terms, this means it would provide “flood control”, “water filtration”, “carbon sequestration”, “scenic beauty”, and “recreation”.  All of these services have economic value, and the challenge now is not only to quantify that value, but to show people that it’s in their interest to pay for it.

The US Clean Water Act addressed that issue by placing tight controls on the destruction of wetlands and mandating that any new development lead to “no net loss” of important wetlands – usually interpreted to mean those that are part of a viable watershed system.  This provision for “no net loss” led to the practice of mitigation banking, which encourages developers to proactively rescue soggy farms and return them to their natural state in the hope of selling credits to nearby developers whose activities destroy or degrade wetlands.  The net result should, in theory, be a gradual restoration of those wetlands that deliver the most value.

Army Corps has the Right Idea

The Army Corps of Engineers issues the permits that govern mitigation banking, and this year it also aims to win approval for a new plan that would let more water go where it wants to go by promoting the use of natural floodplains.

“Whenever possible, the best way to manage floods is with a natural floodplain,” said Terrence “Rock” Salt, the US Army’s deputy assistant secretary overseeing the Corps of Engineers’ water-resource policy, in a Wall Street Journal story earlier this week.

The Corps has already begun to implement the plan, but bringing it to scale may require a new approach to mitigation banking – one based not on the foundation of “no net loss”, but instead based on the value of restored ecosystem services.

Payments for Ecosystem Services

There’s plenty of evidence to support the contention that better land stewardship is, in the long term, more economical than the status quo; there are also scores of mechanisms for rewarding that stewardship. Fishermen in the Gulf of Mexico, for example, have suffered because fertilizers from farms all along the Mississippi River and its tributaries are accumulating there, and water trading programs are already underway that reward farmers who reduce the runoff into rivers, lakes, and streams.

Other emerging payment mechanisms promote the restoration not only of  wetlands, but also of forests and other living ecosystems, as well as habitat supporting endangered species, and then enticing those who either benefit from these services or contribute to their destruction to instead pay for their upkeep.

These mechanisms promote healthy rivers, streams, and lakes by creating a financial incentive for practicing good stewardship of the watershed surrounding them.

The City of New York offers a prime example.  Faced with the prospect of spending nearly $10 billion on a new filtration plant or paying landowners in the surrounding Catskill Mountains to maintain the watershed, they chose to pay the landowners.  The experiment has saved the city billions, and in the process yielded lessons for similar programs now being implemented across Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Where Does the Money Come From?

Mitigation banking is driven by private demand for restoration.  It exists outside the sphere of federal or non-profit grant funding, and is a cost of doing business for developers.  As a result, it only happens where houses, roads, and factories are being built.

But our nation’s green infrastructure – like its built infrastructure – is suffering even in places where no new development is underway. Indeed, some of the places most in need of green restoration are those where new development is receding, and much of the flooding taking place along the Mississippi stems from a lack of ecosystem services upstream. What’s more, some of the worst flooding is taking place in tributaries far removed from the Mississippi itself, in drained marshes that could prove prime for wetland development.

It makes sense for those who benefit the most from improvements to green infrastructure to also bear their share of the cost, but in the end, we all benefit.  Therefore, we should be exploring innovative financing mechanisms that involve a combination of private and public funding, as well as a combination of private and public service providers.

Additional resources

New Guide:
Corporate Ecosystem Valuation

The World Business Council for Sustainable Development has released its new Guide to Corporate Ecosystem Valuation (CEV). The guide, the first major attempt to package approaches to ecosystem valuation specifically for business, offers private sector actors a framework for understanding how – and how much – their businesses depend on ecosystem services.

8 April 2011 | The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) released today its new Guide to Corporate Ecosystem Valuation (CEV). The guide, the first major attempt to package approaches to ecosystem valuation specifically for business, offers private sector actors a framework for understanding how – and how much – their businesses depend on ecosystem services.

Ecosystem impacts have often been overlooked by businesses; ecosystem service market advocates tend to gaze longingly at the regulatory drivers and price signals that carbon enjoys. The WBCSD’s guide is a step in the right direction. It offers a clear process for business decision-makers (whom the guide does not assume have any prior knowledge of this kind of thing) to assess how benefits from healthy ecosystems, such as a forest’s ability to control erosion, filter water, and clean the air, directly affect the bottom line. A beverage company, for example, is in big trouble if its water supplies are being contaminated or cut off by deforestation or pollution upstream.

The guide is the product of an 18-month process working with Environmental Resources Management (ERM), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and World Resources Institute (WRI), and eighteen businesses, whose experience and lessons learned on the CEV process are presented throughout the guide.

The report’s goal is to clarify ways in which CEV can aid in corporate decision-making and inform existing analytical approaches like internal accounting, risk assessments, or share price valuation. It is not, the authors hasten to add, “a price list of biodiversity & ecosystem services, a calculator to ‘crunch numbers’, or a stand-alone methodology.”

The guide doesn’t actually cover economic valuation techniques themselves; instead it recommends that the business bring in “an experienced environmental economist” and consult other WBCSD resources. This shouldn’t be so surprising. Ecosystem services valuation methodologies are pretty esoteric, and continually evolving.

It also focuses just on initial measurement; a framework for translating CEV into concrete actions to take to protect or improve benefits, like payments for ecosystem services or investment in green infrastructure, is left for another day.

Another open question is verification. No widely-accepted guidelines exist on standards for verifying or presenting CEV data publicly, in contrast to the carbon world, where efforts like the Carbon Disclosure Project have done much to standardize reporting. Shared metrics and methodologies (and not just in dollar terms, either) for business to assess their impacts on water or biodiversity, for example, still are lacking.

Still, it’s an impressive and ambitious project. Businesses, like ecosystems, are unique, and the reader is struck by just how complex CEV is really is. Valuation, to give a rough example, requires outlining a range of alternative future scenarios, identifying environmental baselines and the environmental changes to to be valued, the significance of those changes, which valuation technique is to be used, how values translate into costs and benefits not only to the company but other stakeholders, not to mention making choices about risk, uncertain variables, discount ratios, and so on. Developing user-friendly but robust valuation approaches that are flexible enough to work for any business structure is an enormous project, and this guide is only the beginning.

To the extent that it clarifies for business how ecosystem services contribute to the bottom line, the guide can help to align environmental, social, economic, and financial values in the private sector, and drive some much-needed investment into ecosystem service markets. All in all, exciting stuff.

 

Additional resources

On the Blog: EPA Authority Over Greenhouse Gasses Remains Tenuous

NOTE: This article appeared first on EKO-ECO Blog.   Find the original post here.

7 April 2011 | The US Senate on Wednesday narrowly preserved the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act by shooting down a bill that denies scientific findings on climate change. That preservation, however, remains tenuous at best.

First, the 50/50 split on the Inhofe-McConnell bill means that half of the US Senate actually voted to ignore overwhelming consensus on climate change.

Second, a story posted today in E&E News makes it clear that more than 60 senators favored bills curtailing the EPA’s authority (subscription required) to regulate greenhouse gasses, even if they didn’t vote in favor of the more draconian bill:

Last night’s vote on four competing EPA amendments showed that 64 senators are willing to vote for legislation that would strip, limit or delay EPA’s rules to curb heat-trapping emissions from stationary sources. But the measures were significantly different from each other, and the ideological and political divisions between their supporters may make it difficult to forge an agreement.

Those bills that garnered the 14 other votes were introduced by conservative Democrats, and would have put a moratorium on the EPAs authority to regulate greenhouse gasses.

Then, today the House of Representatives passed a now-meaningless bill that does pretty much the same thing as the bill that was shot down.

You can bet this one isn’t over – and it isn’t going to get prettier.

The Hypocrisy of Land-Use Accounting

Climate talks have resumed in Bangkok, with several familiar sticking points.   One issue that has overstayed its welcome is the debate over how developed countries should account for carbon stored in and released from their farms, forests, prairies, and bogs.   Current rules let them decide which types of land use they will account for and which they can ignore.   Developing countries say that’s not fair, and with good reason.

This article has been excerpted from the Humane Society International Bulletin “Call for Truth in Targets” (avalible for download, right), which was distributed to negotiators attending this week’s climate talks in Bangkok, Thailand.   If you repost, please reference the original.

5 April 2011 | BANGKOK | Under the accounting rules of the Kyoto Protocol there is no requirement to account comprehensively for all emissions from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). In a nutshell, this allows Annex 1 developed country Parties to pick and choose what they will account for and, as a result, they tend not to select to account for emissive activities. Their accounts are thus skewed by the incorporation of removals (sequestration) whilst leaving out emissions (logging).

This is the existing emissions loophole. Targets for Annex 1 developed countries are being undermined by the failure to even get important emissions onto the books.

The present accounting system is activities-based. It does not cover the entire land sector as would occur if land-based accounting was instituted. This is another problem for getting a real reflection of what is happening in land and forests into the accounts. The current LULUCF system defines several activities occurring in the land and forests sector but only mandates accounting for three activities1, leaving it voluntary for Parties to select to account for any other identified activities2. For instance there is no requirement to account for the drainage of peat soils and use of drained peatlands although both are known to be highly emissive.

The three activities that are currently mandated for accounting are:

  • Afforestation: this means planting trees on an area not previously forested, usually it is plantation establishment;
  • Reforestation: this means replanting trees (plantations) on an area that has been previously deforested and maintained as non-forested land; and
  • Deforestation: this comprises land use change through clearing forest and using that land for other purposes than growing forest again.

Afforestation and Reforestation (known as A & R) deliver removals of carbon from the atmosphere via sequestration within the growing vegetation and soils.
Deforestation involves carbon emissions attributable to land use change, but this activity is restricted in the emissions it includes because it does not encompass the major emitting activity of logging when that area is subject to ongoing logging cycles, nor does it encompass the conversion of natural forest to plantations.

In both cases no land use change is involved. These instead fall under the voluntary activity of Forest Management, which is only selected by some of the Parties.

A cynic might note that the current accounting system is basically constructed to indicate when land enters or leaves the control of the forest industry while hiding harm industry does with the forest it controls. The current voluntary activities for LULUCF accounting are:

  • Forest management (logging, and conversion of natural forests to plantations);
  • Cropland management; and
  • Grazing land management.

Each of these activities is generally emissive in nature and they are not frequently selected for accounting. This loophole is of a significant size. For example drained organic soils in developed countries emit about half a billion tonnes of CO2 emissions every year.

Encouragingly, it was decided in Cancun that a new, voluntary activity of ‘Drainage and rewetting’ of peatland should be adopted. This is welcome progress, as emissions from drained peatlands are large and ongoing until such drainage is reversed and the peat is rewetted or the peat exhausted. It can be predicted that Annex 1 Parties will select this new activity only when they are rewetting peatland and can gain from accounting for the emissions reductions involved, but this is an important and welcome initiative.

Currently, there is not even a proposal to make all of the remaining voluntary LULUCF activities mandatory for accounting let alone a commitment to do so. Mandatory accounting is the least that should be expected in terms of a move towards more comprehensive coverage in LULUCF in the Second Commitment Period. A ‘hot spots’ approach involving applying higher tier accounting to areas known to be of significant emissions impact, whilst the remainder is dealt with by lower tier accounting, is being discussed within the EU in order to overcome objections to the accounting impost entailed with a move to mandatory accounting. This is a commendable idea.

Proposed new accounting rules for logging (‘forest management’) are problematic and introduce their own emissions accounting loophole.   Criticism over the serious inadequacies of accounting for land sector emissions of developed countries under current LULUCF rules has prompted negotiations to construct new rules that will encourage most or all Annex 1 Parties to account for forest management (logging).

The problem is that the new accounting method that is proposed is more perverse than those we have now.

Developed countries are pushing hard for a new accounting framework that allows them to increase logging emissions without taking responsibility for them. This planned increase in emissions has been estimated at around half a billion tonnes of CO2 in total.   The proposed approach simply removes logging emissions from the books.

How does the logging loophole happen?

This is called the ‘reference level’ approach. It works by allowing each developed country to pick any level of emissions it likes and use it as a baseline.

Many Annex 1 countries have indicated that they intend to use forward looking (or projected) baselines. These countries plan to use Business As Usual (BAU) emissions, including any planned increases, based on their existing national forest and forest industry policy settings, as their baseline. Only deviations in emissions from this baseline will be accounted for. In other words, however grandiose their LULUCF growth plans may be, if they meet them, their accounting liability would be zero. Perversely, if actual emissions turn out to be less than their grandiose plans, the LULUCF system will book an undeserved accounting credit.

Such a projected reference level is designed to measure deviation from planned growth. It also serves to hide any increases in emissions associated with such planned growth. It prevents any level of ambition being imposed upon the sector.

Logging emissions should be measured relative to historical emissions data, and the intent should be to reduce them relative to those emissions levels. Use of a long term historical average as the baseline is the only option that closes the accounting loophole in a realistic and acceptable way.

Why has the logging loophole been designed?

Annex 1 Parties are failing to conserve stores (reservoirs) and enhance sinks and reservoirs. Many Parties intend to increase harvest rates and emissions from forest management. They are under pressure to account for forest management in the second Commitment Period.   However most of those Parties find owning up to the real emissions to be inconvenient. These emissions would not be reflected in accounts using the projected reference level approach.

Why does it matter?

If LULUCF is to strengthen ambition, the proposed accounting loophole for more logging must be closed. It is a serious departure from what a climate agreement should set out to achieve. Such perverse rules are not being constructed for other industry sectors. The forest industry is stitching up a deal all of their own with the complicit support of developed country Party negotiators. It is unlikely that other industries have been consulted as to whether they think it acceptable that forestry gets such a free ride and they do not.

There is significant carbon contained in developed country forests, and a large amount of emissions will arise from logging them. Three of the top five forested countries of the world are developed countries (Canada, USA, Russia) and Australia has the most carbon dense natural forests in the world.

Developed countries must reduce their logging emissions, not increase them. The first necessary step is that they agree to account for them properly and comprehensively. Hiding logging emissions in this new forward looking baseline accounting loophole will significantly undermine the targets of developed countries to make quantified economy wide emissions reductions while encouraging them to miss a great opportunity to increase ambition.

Alistair Graham has thirty years experience working with and for local, national and international ENGOs on a wide range of conservation and environment issues, especially native forest conservation and oceans governance, including negotiation and implementation of regional and global international agreements.   He can be reached at: [email protected].
Additional resources

Army Corps Needs to Examine Rationale for Mitigation Territories

Mitigation bankers have long complained that different regulatory agencies apply different standards, and a study published late last year in the “National Wetlands Newsletter” bears that out – at least when it comes to how the 38 districts of the Army Corps of Engineers determine the amount of territory individual mitigation banks should be allowed to cover.

An extended version of this article will be published in Volume 36, Issue 1 of the Harvard Environmental Law Review in February 2012.

18 March 2011 | With the exception of carbon dioxide, ecosystem service markets are prisoners of their own geography – and with good reason.

If you emit carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases in, say, Chicago, you can make good on your damage by saving a patch of rainforest in Brazil; but if you damage a wetland in Virginia, you can’t make good by restoring a patch of the Everglades.   If that were allowed, it could lead to all the destruction of habitat across the United States being offset by massive restoration in Florida.   That might be good for Florida, but it would be a disaster for the rest of the country.

That’s why the Army Corps of Engineers delineates geographic service areas where mitigation banks and in-lieu fee programs (ILFs) can sell offsets.

These service areas are the region within which banks may sell offsets, and their size can make or break a market.

Bigger service areas increase competition and bolster credit demand.   They can even help attract mitigation banker investment.   If they’re too big, however, they can amplify degradation hotspots as restoration clusters in one area and damage clusters in another.

One way to prevent the creation of such hotspots is to keep service areas small.   This ensures that damage to wetlands and streams is offset close to home, but could result in thin, inactive markets which lack the credit demand to stimulate investment in restoration before impacts.

The Right Size

Because the nation’s terrain varies widely from region to region, the government gives the Army Corps of Engineers tremendous leeway in determining the optimal size of service areas.   As a result, service areas vary considerably in size, type, and rigor across the nation, according to a study we conducted in 2009.

Unfortunately, the variance we documented doesn’t reflect the geographical variance of a large nation, but rather the administrative variance across the Army Corps’ 38 districts – as well as variance within districts.   Indeed, we found several instances where standards applied led to exactly the kind of distortions we touched on above.

To provide a more effective mitigation system, increased rigor and ecological justification for service areas is needed within individual Corps districts and states to ensure that private mitigation banks, public banks, and ILFs all compete on an even playing field. State and local governments should also ensure that their service area standards do not undermine federal directives to favor mitigation banks and utilize a “watershed approach” to compensatory mitigation.

Regulatory Determinants of Service Areas

Geographic concerns and service areas are at the heart of the federal regulations released by the US Environmental Protection Agency and the US Army Corps of Engineers in 2008 (the Rule). The Rule endorses the use of a “watershed approach” which seeks to strategically locate wetland and stream compensatory mitigation sites where they will best persist over time and restore aquatic resource functions and services.

Service areas are a principal tool for setting ecologically appropriate spatial bounds for the watershed approach. However, the Rule rejects establishing a national preference for the watershed scale or service area size to be used in implementing a watershed approach. These geographic priorities are delegated to regional Interagency Review Teams (IRTs) and ultimately, for the purposes of the Clean Water Act (CWA), to Corps district engineers. The Rule also specifically notes that concerns for “economic viability” can influence service areas.  

The 2008 regulations also establish a preference hierarchy among compensatory mitigation providers, sequentially favoring use of mitigation banks, ILFs, and permittee-responsible mitigation (PRM). Though not mentioned explicitly in the 2008 regulations, service areas are crucial to implementation of the Rule’s preference for mitigation banks. If regulators indeed want to increase use mitigation banks, they must be willing to set bank service areas that encompass enough potential wetland and stream impacts to merit entrepreneurial investment before these impacts occur — particularly for bank sites that strategically address watershed needs.

State governments also can significantly influence service area size, type, and rigor through state assumption of CWA §404 permitting, CWA §401 certification, IRT participation, Memoranda of Agreement with the Corps and EPA, state statutes, and/or state regulations. Furthermore, local governments may pass ordinances that require compensatory mitigation to occur within their boundaries or may impose higher mitigation requirements for compensation trades that move wetlands or streams outside of local jurisdiction.

Spatial Quality vs. Temporal Quality

Two significant components of the overall ecological quality of wetland or stream compensatory mitigation are its spatial quality — the proximity of restoration to impacts — and its temporal quality — the “time lag” between when impacts occur and when lost ecosystem functions are restored.

Spatial and temporal quality may exhibit tradeoffs in wetland and stream mitigation markets. Small service areas enhance spatial quality by keeping ecosystem functions nearby impacts, but may discourage investment in mitigation banking before impacts occur, causing permittees to increasingly rely on lower temporal quality offsets (ILFs and PRM). Exceptional ILFs that provide compensatory mitigation before impacts occur may also experience these spatial-temporal tradeoffs: when a service area is too small, and projected credit demand too low to provide the certainty needed for mitigation before impacts, these ILFs may have to wait until after impacts occur to replace aquatic resources. Alternatively, large service areas may promote increased investment in restoration before impacts by mitigation banks and some ILFs, but naturally allow wetlands and streams to be transferred further from impacts.

‘Hotspots’

When geographic service areas are excessively large, concentrated ‘hotspots’ of wetland or stream degradation may develop as a result of the aquatic resource trading process. Case studies of wetland mitigation banks or ILFs in Illinois, Oregon, North Carolina, and Florida note that wetland trading facilitates a “migration” of wetlands from urban to rural areas, with a parallel pattern emerging for stream mitigation in North Carolina. Generally, this aquatic resource “migration” is a result of simple economics — urban land typically has higher development value than rural land. This systematic transfer of wetlands and streams to rural areas may deprive urban populations of certain aquatic resource functions and services. Moreover, urban-to-rural movement of wetlands and streams is easily preventable — reducing the geographic size of mitigation markets will minimize localized resource losses.

‘No Net Loss’

Service areas also implicate the guiding principle for the CWA §404 program — ‘no net loss’ of aquatic resource coverage and functions. No net loss, which is generally measured on a national or state level, inherently requires specification of an appropriate geographic scale to balance losses and gains of wetlands and streams. The entire US may achieve a goal of no net loss, but this policy is clearly ineffective if certain regions become devoid of aquatic resources and other, distant regions offset these losses through development of abundant aquatic resource supplies.

Stringently enforced service areas can set an ecologically defensible scale at which to balance wetland and stream losses and gains, such as various types of watersheds or ecoregions. Preventing trading of aquatic resources outside of a service area helps to ensure ‘no net loss’ at that scale.

Implications for Ecosystem Services

Service area size may also affect the societal value of the ecosystem services provided by wetlands and streams. Determining the societal value of wetland and stream ecosystem services requires overlaying the geographic extent and quality of particular ecosystem functions and the societal demand for these ecosystem functions. When service areas allow particular ecosystem functions to be transferred from a location with high societal demand for ecosystem functions to a location with low societal demand, the transaction may result in a net loss of ecosystem services. To maintain ecosystem services which are more valuable nearby human population centers, regulators may use social or political boundaries such as city limits or county boundaries in setting service areas.

Study Results

From January to October of 2009, we compiled mitigation bank service area standards and preferences in all 38 Corps districts. We researched publicly accessible laws, regulations, and guidance in Corps districts and states with mitigation siting preferences from January to May of 2009, and then contacted cognizant Corps and state personnel by phone or e-mail from May to October of 2009 to clarify district and state service area procedures. Based on the flexibility of a district’s service area criteria and the rigor with which service areas were implemented, we classified Corps districts as “hard” or “soft.” A full listing of the “hard” and “soft” Corps districts, along with an explanation of service area criteria for each Corps district, is available in our National Wetlands Newsletter article. When available, we also gathered information on ILF service areas and geographic restrictions applied to off-site PRM.

The most common geographic system used for mitigation bank service areas is the US Geological Survey’s nationwide Hydrologic Unit Code (HUC) system. HUCs are delineated based on hydrologic drainage basins or unique hydrologic attributes and are surveyed at a number of levels; HUCs with more digits are more geographically specific. The EPA’s ecoregion system is also a popular geographic system used in service areas. Ecoregions are delineated based on biotic and abiotic factors indicative of ecological conformity, including hydrology, wildlife, land use, soils, climate, vegetation, physiography, and geology. As with HUCs, ecoregions are defined at different levels of geographic specificity. Other national, regional, or local hydrologic or ecological assessments may be used to set service areas, and political boundaries may also influence service areas.

IRTs and Corps districts apply considerably different service area types with different levels of flexibility to mitigation banks across the nation. Some Corps districts, such as those in Alaska, Albuquerque, New England, Philadelphia, Sacramento, and Tulsa designate service areas on a case-by-case basis, while all other Corps districts use some form of geographic guidelines for service areas. Some Corps districts with geographic guidelines also readily allow use of different service area types.

Geographic limits used for primary service areas include 11-digit HUCs (HUC-11s), HUC-10s, HUC-8s, HUC-6s, Level IV ecoregions, Albert ecoregions (regional system), Ecological Drainage Units (EDUs), independent Corps district or state watershed assessments, tidal/nontidal wetland boundaries, counties, cities, and simple 20- or 40- mile radii from banks. State-defined limits include New Jersey Watershed Management Areas, Washington Water Resource Inventory Areas, and Wisconsin Geographic Management Units. The most common watershed scale used for primary service areas is the HUC-8, which is used in 25 of 38 Corps districts; however, the HUC-8 is implemented in different capacities and with different rigor in these Corps districts.

After a bank’s service area is assigned, Corps districts and states also vary in how rigorously they impose use of this primary service area. Some Corps districts or states specify secondary service areas in a bank’s instrument which are used when permittees are not located in the primary service area of any bank; alternately, IRTs may allow banks to sell credits outside of their primary service area on a case-by-case basis. In relevant districts, secondary service areas are often accompanied with higher credit ratios which are specified in a bank’s instrument and are defined by adjacent HUC-8s or HUC-6s, which may further be constrained by HUC-3s, river basins, or Level III ecoregions. When case-by-case use of credits beyond a primary service area is allowed, higher credit ratios, such as 1.5, 2, or 4, often accompany these exemptions.

Different geographic restrictions may also apply to sales of stream mitigation credits. Existing rules, guidelines, or agency practices spatially restrict stream compensatory mitigation in select Corps districts or states by HUC-12, by HUC-8, by physiographic province, within one stream order of an impact, and to streams of a similar habitat designation.

In 2009, ILF service areas exhibited considerable variability. ILFs utilized HUC-12s, HUC-11s, HUC-10s, HUC-8s, HUC-6s, EDUs, state-defined river basins and marine regions, physiographic provinces, major land resource areas, municipalities, counties, states, and general regions (e.g., a peninsula or a portion of a state). It is important to note that while some ILFs used very small service areas, such as HUC-12s, they often simply targeted compensation at that scale and were allowed to expand the geographic area for replacement when necessary. Alternatively, some ILFs which were not compliant with the 2008 Rule operated with no service areas.

A number of Corps districts and states have also developed geographic limits for the location of off-site PRM wetland and stream compensation projects. Off-site PRM is limited based on HUC-11s, HUC-10s, HUC-8s, HUC-6s, Level III ecoregions, Corps-defined watersheds, state-defined watersheds, locally defined watersheds, stream basins, parishes, counties, states, Corps districts, and islands. Distant PRM projects also commonly require use of higher credit ratios.

Implications

Use of a proper watershed scale is critical to the watershed approach, the preference for mitigation banking, and the spatial and temporal quality of compensatory mitigation projects. In addition, IRTs should strive to consistently consider equivalent criteria when setting service areas for all applicants. Accordingly, Corps districts without service area standards would likely benefit from merely establishing service area criteria, and districts that regularly allow exceptions to service area standards would likely benefit from either reducing the number of exceptions or increasing the ecological validity of these exceptions.

In areas with established service area preferences, our study encountered two troubling realities. First, some permittees offsetting linear impacts (e.g. transportation projects), which are frequently government agencies, were granted geographic exceptions allowing them more latitude to use mitigation banks outside of their service areas. Laws, regulations, or guidance in Florida, Missouri, Ohio, and Washington allow linear projects to consolidate impacts across multiple service areas at a single compensation site, and in Minnesota and Virginia specifically grant this ability to government transportation agencies. Allowing impacts to be compensated in other service areas may be ecologically defensible, such as when a permittee consolidates all compensatory mitigation in a high-needs watershed. However, expressly granting service area exceptions to particular permittees or banks without ecological justification undermines one of the primary objectives of the Rule—promoting equivalent standards for all mitigation providers.

Government agencies, including transportation agencies in all of the states with listed service area exceptions, often utilize state-run mitigation banks to offset internal demand for wetland and stream credits. This means that public mitigation banks offsetting linear government projects may be allowed more service area exceptions than other banks. Unless public mitigation banks are demonstrably ecologically superior to comparable entrepreneurial banks, regulators should apply equivalent standards to both types of mitigation providers.

Moreover, some ILFs we studied operated under less restrictive service area standards than similarly situated mitigation banks. Unless ILFs provide advance compensatory mitigation of equal or greater ecological value than banks, ILF service area sizes should not exceed, or even equal, bank service areas to avoid subverting the Rule’s preference for mitigation banks. Service area size is not irrelevant for ILFs—adequate market demand must exist in a service area to justify advance investment in developing a compensation planning framework and the operational procedures required in an instrument. However, as ILFs generally sell wetland or stream offsets to permittees before investing in site-specific land acquisition or mitigation plans, the geographic market size of an ILF is inherently less determinant of its economic viability — if market demand is low in a particular service area, an ILF simply does not undertake as much compensatory mitigation in that service area. Indeed, the ability of ILFs to provide wetland and stream credits in areas without adequate demand for establishment of mitigation banks is a primary reason for their retention under the Rule.

On the other hand, mitigation banks must invest in land acquisition, protection, and mitigation plans before selling credits to permittees, giving them less geographic flexibility to accommodate market demand after-the-fact and making service area size more central to their economic stability. As ILFs increasingly begin to comply with the new operational standards set forth in the Rule, it will be important to track the size, type, and rigor of ILF service areas.

A common factor in these two service area problems is that governments operate both public mitigation banks and ILFs and may experience conflicts of interest when they also regulate these banks or ILFs through the IRT. Government entities should ensure that agencies responsible for administering mitigation banks or ILFs are not also members of IRTs to reduce self-regulatory conflicts.

Conclusions

Even in Corps districts and states with rigorous service area standards, the current scientific and economic rationale used to set service areas leaves much to be desired. Initiatives to better understand the dynamics of spatial-temporal tradeoffs for mitigation, the geographic scales at which ecosystem functions operate, and how these factors contribute to ecosystem service valuation should improve criteria for setting service areas, and more generally, watershed scale.

In the meantime, regulators should be cognizant of the importance of service areas to the overall environmental performance of aquatic resource mitigation markets. While consistency is important, it is also imperative to encourage and reward ecologically successful mitigation projects. When mitigation providers produce projects that result in demonstrable, empirically grounded ecological restoration, regulators should consider expanding the service area to increase the marketability of these credits.  

 

Additional resources

New Guide:Corporate Ecosystem Valuation

The World Business Council for Sustainable Development has released its new Guide to Corporate Ecosystem Valuation (CEV). The guide, the first major attempt to package approaches to ecosystem valuation specifically for business, offers private sector actors a framework for understanding how – and how much – their businesses depend on ecosystem services.

8 April 2011 | The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) released today its new Guide to Corporate Ecosystem Valuation (CEV). The guide, the first major attempt to package approaches to ecosystem valuation specifically for business, offers private sector actors a framework for understanding how – and how much – their businesses depend on ecosystem services.

Ecosystem impacts have often been overlooked by businesses; ecosystem service market advocates tend to gaze longingly at the regulatory drivers and price signals that carbon enjoys. The WBCSD’s guide is a step in the right direction. It offers a clear process for business decision-makers (whom the guide does not assume have any prior knowledge of this kind of thing) to assess how benefits from healthy ecosystems, such as a forest’s ability to control erosion, filter water, and clean the air, directly affect the bottom line. A beverage company, for example, is in big trouble if its water supplies are being contaminated or cut off by deforestation or pollution upstream.

The guide is the product of an 18-month process working with Environmental Resources Management (ERM), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and World Resources Institute (WRI), and eighteen businesses, whose experience and lessons learned on the CEV process are presented throughout the guide.

The report’s goal is to clarify ways in which CEV can aid in corporate decision-making and inform existing analytical approaches like internal accounting, risk assessments, or share price valuation. It is not, the authors hasten to add, “a price list of biodiversity & ecosystem services, a calculator to ‘crunch numbers’, or a stand-alone methodology.”

The guide doesn’t actually cover economic valuation techniques themselves; instead it recommends that the business bring in “an experienced environmental economist” and consult other WBCSD resources. This shouldn’t be so surprising. Ecosystem services valuation methodologies are pretty esoteric, and continually evolving.

It also focuses just on initial measurement; a framework for translating CEV into concrete actions to take to protect or improve benefits, like payments for ecosystem services or investment in green infrastructure, is left for another day.

Another open question is verification. No widely-accepted guidelines exist on standards for verifying or presenting CEV data publicly, in contrast to the carbon world, where efforts like the Carbon Disclosure Project have done much to standardize reporting. Shared metrics and methodologies (and not just in dollar terms, either) for business to assess their impacts on water or biodiversity, for example, still are lacking.

Still, it’s an impressive and ambitious project. Businesses, like ecosystems, are unique, and the reader is struck by just how complex CEV is really is. Valuation, to give a rough example, requires outlining a range of alternative future scenarios, identifying environmental baselines and the environmental changes to to be valued, the significance of those changes, which valuation technique is to be used, how values translate into costs and benefits not only to the company but other stakeholders, not to mention making choices about risk, uncertain variables, discount ratios, and so on. Developing user-friendly but robust valuation approaches that are flexible enough to work for any business structure is an enormous project, and this guide is only the beginning.

To the extent that it clarifies for business how ecosystem services contribute to the bottom line, the guide can help to align environmental, social, economic, and financial values in the private sector, and drive some much-needed investment into ecosystem service markets. All in all, exciting stuff.

 

Additional resources

We Must all Learn from Each Other

Western science has achieved great things, but it often misses the obvious – at least from the perspective of indigenous peoples who have lived with that obvious for generations.   The same blind spot applies to indigenous peoples – a blind spot that can have devastating implications for the development of forest carbon projects if not addressed.

15 March 2011 | In the mid 1990s, research scientists from Environment Canada encountered a puzzling phenomenon.   The Common Eider (Somateria mollissima sedentary), a non-migratory bird native from Hudson Bay, Nunavut, Canada, near the Inuit community of Sanikiluaq were dying off in droves, and none of the scientists could figure out why.  

The local Inuit, however, had been hunting and harvesting the Common Eider for generations.   They knew the bird’s habits, its quirks, and its needsand they knew that the birds were dying because they’d lost their access to open water.   Only when this information was shared with western scientists could appropriate action take place.

This enlightening case study from Ethno-Ornithology: Birds, Indigenous Peoples, Culture and Society is, unfortunately, the exception that proves the rule.

More often than not, indigenous peoples have not had the kind of access to western scientific information regarding biodiversity that the Sanikiluaq Inuit had, and scientists have not had the kind of access to indigenous knowledge that the Environment Canada team did.   This can have significant ecological and financial consequences for forest carbon projects.

Communication Breakdown

Conservation dialogues between indigenous communities and western scientists are not only hampered by the lack of effective communication between scientists and indigenous peoples, they are also hampered because most scientific information is not available in local languages.

If we wanted to engage in avian conservation in Honduras, for example, we’d soon find that all the guidebooks are in English, which means we would be challenged to discuss basic conservation information – much less conservation finance outcomes – with the local communities, because there would be no foundational material in Spanish. This is further compounded by the inability of forest carbon project developers to discuss biodiversity in contexts that are well-understood by locals working on the projects, regardless of whether the locals also speak English, as is required by the Verified Carbon Standard and the Climate, Community, Biodiversity Standard.

Furthermore, if indigenous communities are going to benefit from carbon payments for saving endangered rainforest and reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), they need to base their decisions on both traditional and western scientific knowledge that can be effectively communicated. Integrating traditional knowledge with scientific knowledge can improve and clarify land-tenure rights for indigenous communities by bringing clarity to hunting, harvesting, and co-management of biodiversity resources on their traditional community forestry lands. As shown in the Maya Atlas: The Struggle to Preserve Maya Land in Southern Belize, 42 local communities in southern Belize used rural participatory mapping techniques to demonstrate how they traditionally used their local environment including their diverse relationships with location specific ecology and biodiversity.

Ethno-Ornithology: Birds, Indigenous Peoples, Culture and Society is replete with case studies like this.   In another Inuit example, an unknown population of the Harlequin Duck (Histrionicus histrionics) was only discovered on Baffin Island in the Arctic after not being observed in this location since the 1930s when scientists and Inuit communicated with each other because shared of interests in conservation and biodiversity.

How Can Locals Help?

Local participation is critical for knowledge transfer and effective conservation management dialogue.   The implementation of remote camera wildlife surveys, for example, can help standardize the ways that biodiversity health is measured under the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standard (CCB). These low-cost surveys are easily demonstrated visually to local community members, which means that applying these survey techniques does not require all team members on the survey team to be western trained biologists allowing for the opportunity for local traditional knowledge and western scientific knowledge to interact effectively.

Western public values often set the conservation agenda, which in turn impacts conservation finance and indigenous peoples. Yet, if we do not clarify the relationship between traditional knowledge and biodiversity, we will struggle to enact successful forest carbon projects at the local level on community forest lands because both local communities will be unable to communicate with western reductionist scientists, and neither will be able to bridge the gap and act as stewards of local lands.

Traditional knowledge owners must become co-creators, co-designers, and co-managers of community forest lands through integrating traditional and western scientific knowledge with scientists if we hope to mitigate climate change.

On the Blog: EPA Authority Over Greenhouse Gasses Remains Tenuous

NOTE: This article appeared first on EKO-ECO Blog.   Find the original post here.

7 April 2011 | The US Senate on Wednesday narrowly preserved the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act by shooting down a bill that denies scientific findings on climate change. That preservation, however, remains tenuous at best.

First, the 50/50 split on the Inhofe-McConnell bill means that half of the US Senate actually voted to ignore overwhelming consensus on climate change.

Second, a story posted today in E&E News makes it clear that more than 60 senators favored bills curtailing the EPA’s authority (subscription required) to regulate greenhouse gasses, even if they didn’t vote in favor of the more draconian bill:

Last night’s vote on four competing EPA amendments showed that 64 senators are willing to vote for legislation that would strip, limit or delay EPA’s rules to curb heat-trapping emissions from stationary sources. But the measures were significantly different from each other, and the ideological and political divisions between their supporters may make it difficult to forge an agreement.

Those bills that garnered the 14 other votes were introduced by conservative Democrats, and would have put a moratorium on the EPAs authority to regulate greenhouse gasses.

Then, today the House of Representatives passed a now-meaningless bill that does pretty much the same thing as the bill that was shot down.

You can bet this one isn’t over – and it isn’t going to get prettier.

Environmental Sustainability is the New Economic Bottom Line

That’s the message in “Accounting for Sustainability: Practical Insights”, which culls insights from a five-year project sponsored by Prince Charles that examined the feasibility of factoring industries’impact on the environment into their economic spreadsheets. Using case studies and interviews with leaders at major accounting firms, the book documents the bond between capitalism and environmental capital.

22 February 2011 | Novo Nordisk, a world leader in diabetes health care, also seized the role as leader in the growing field of sustainability accounting, an “Accounting for Sustainability” case study demonstrates, by embedding the cost of protecting the environment into the company’s business model.   The book documents how external stakeholders began pushing Nova Nordisk to become more environmentally friendly in the early ‘90s.     In response, the corporation initiated a strategic initiative to embed its sustainability and financial reporting into a single document.     This method of reporting turned it into an industry leader by 2004. Its financial reports include, for example, water and energy impacts per business unit for diabetes care and biopharmaceuticals. By allowing business units to track their water and energy usage per business line firms can now report and compare their environmental impacts and performance with other market competitors.

Sustainability – Now a Strategic Business Objective

Novo Nordisk represents just one of a host of in-depth case studies completed during the five-year Accounting for Sustainability project initiated by Prince Charles in Great Britain.   Through Novo Nordisk, the book illustrates by example how sustainability works as a strategic business objective.   “Accounting for Sustainability” uses other case studies to illustrate the role of accounting processes to support behavioral and business change;   how to select key performance indicators (KPI) and the role of qualitative and quantitative financial and non-financial information.

The role of accounting processes to support behavioral and business change, for example, can serve as a significant tool for encouraging and guiding businesses into making more sustainable choices. A case study about the Environmental Agency UK shows how the agency relies on a staff travel hierarchy that embeds sustainability.   It factors in carbon emissions to determine whether staff should take public transport, walk, ride a bicycle, or lease a car.

Aviva, the global insurance company based in London, meanwhile, uses a   “Connected Reporting Framework (CRF)” that allows it to measure key performance indicators focused on five themes.   These include customers, environment, people, suppliers, and communities. With this information Aviva can report carbon emissions, waste, and resource usage by its five themes. This results in performance benchmarking based on non-financial reporting.

And Sainsbury’s Supermarkets applies qualitative and quantitative financial and non-financial information decision analysis when reporting on their products and the supply chain upstream from their sales. This allowed Sainsbury’s to use reporting structures such as their Lamb Sustainability Assessment report.   It looks at Sainsbury’s lamb sales supply chain of over 7,000 ranchers serving more than 500 Sainsbury grocery stores. It then develops key areas of vulnerability, benchmarks these areas, and improves their performance.

Sustainability Accounting Enhances Ecosystem Markets

“Accounting for Sustainability” can be particularly valuable for organizations within the ecosystem services market.   Case studies illustrate how to design reporting structures to integrate Key Performance Indicators (KPI) to outperform competitors. Using these indicators a forest carbon project developer could demonstrate superior industry performance by measuring its impact on water and its ability to sequester carbon. Another forest carbon project developer could integrate its dollar cost of production per carbon sequestered.

For businesses to thrive, new business models need to factor sustainability into their bottom lines. “Accounting for Sustainability” should inspire the ecosystem services market to develop specific metrics that embed sustainability within business operations.   This will allow the transparent comparison of firms and projects and further develop a trusted marketplace.

In Memory: “Accounting for Sustainability: Practical Insights” is dedicated to Professor Anthony Hopwood who passed away right after editing its last draft.

Voluntary Carbon Fills Compliance Void

18 February 2010 | Last week, Ecosystem Marketplace reported that a major formal voluntary carbon standard has verified its first carbon credits from projects that reduce greenhouse-gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD).

It’s the kind of mechanism that was pioneered and vastly improved in the voluntary carbon markets long before regulators felt comfortable enough to formally admit REDD mechanisms into an international compliance carbon market. Now, REDD is considered to be one of the few success stories at UN climate talks over the past few years.

Though small in comparison to the UN’s Kyoto (and post-Kyoto?) carbon markets, the US state of California’s cap-and-trade scheme is another program soon to hit the market, aiming to start in 2012. This market also employs protocols for project development that originated in the voluntary carbon market, adopting four protocols from the Climate Action Reserve (CAR) that can be used to generate early action credits. The program’s compliance-grade protocols will also be based on CAR’s designs.

Finally, voluntary third-party standards – including CAR, the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and their advisers – are engaging governments around the world to pioneer accounting systems for REDD projects and policies to co-exist within national and sub-national forestry efforts.

Now more than ever – and especially as compliance carbon markets face continued controversy – it is important to recognize and learn from these and other voluntary carbon mechanisms to foster market integrity as a whole.

But even as the voluntary carbon market becomes increasingly integrated with compliance markets worldwide, we continue to observe a niche of voluntary buyers who give the market its name and finance its frontier innovations – and will persist in the marketplace with or without government signals.

The Role of Voluntary Carbon Markets

Companies, organizations and individuals use the voluntary carbon market to set and achieve scientifically informed targets, using a combination of internal and external reductions (i.e. offsets). Companies can make and honor real commitments to significantly reduce their emissions.

The voluntary carbon market plays different roles in different countries and regions. In developed countries that are part of the Kyoto Protocol, the voluntary market makes it possible for companies and individuals who are not covered by existing climate legislation to receive carbon credits for significantly reducing their emissions.

Even companies with existing compliance obligations have made reduction commitments “above and beyond” their obligation by buying voluntary credits.

Companies located in industrialized countries that don’t have domestic cap-and-trade legislation (i.e. the U.S. and Australia) can also use the voluntary market for “pre-compliance purposes.” They learn how the carbon markets and impending legislation would work in practice – and hope to be recognized for taking “early action” to reduce emissions.

In the Global South, companies in middle income countries – particularly those involved in European supply chains – are also taking voluntary action to reduce their emissions.

The voluntary carbon market offers corporate leaders a unique opportunity to show real leadership through action rather than spouting empty rhetoric. Contrast this with business leaders who signed up to the Copenhagen Communiqué on Climate Change – which urged governments to sign a global deal at the 2009 Conference of Parties mandating deep, immediate reductions in emissions but didn’t see results.

While international and domestic climate negotiations stagnate, corporate leaders can actually lead. By voluntarily providing critical funding to emissions reduction projects in the developing world, corporations show true leadership ahead of being mandated to do so by governments. And they have already done so, to the tune of US$387 million invested in voluntary carbon credits in 2009. Indices like the FTSE4Good and the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index have significantly incentivized corporates to become involved in the voluntary carbon market. This involvement has had a direct impact on the companies’ market capitalization.

But the global financial crisis threw a wrench in the voluntary carbon market’s previously unstoppable expansion. You see, companies that aren’t legally required to reduce their emissions do so voluntarily and these commitments are often integrated into a company’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and marketing budget – which is ultimately discretionary. And tough business climates squeeze discretionary budgets first.

In countries without a cap-and-trade programme in sight, pre-compliance activity is slowing down in the voluntary carbon marketplace. There is a limit on how much preparatory action can be taken under continued uncertainty and these countries have been in pre-compliance mode since as early as 2008!

How can the Voluntary Carbon Market Meet these Challenges Head on?

Despite the slow-down in pre-compliance activity, the voluntary carbon market is still equipped to achieve exponential growth if it is able to recognize and communicate its assets – like high quality independent, robust third-party standards which require independent validation and verification to ensure that the offset credits certified are permanent, additional and real.

Standards like CAR and VCS – and also the Gold Standard and CarbonFix forestry standard, among others – have independent registries so that the offsets can be tracked from origination to retirement. This helps create a more transparent and accountable market.

High quality VER standards also demonstrate how the voluntary carbon market is creating the types of projects which were envisaged with the creation of the Kyoto Protocol: emission reduction projects that are delivering real carbon reductions and social and development benefits.

For example, offset projects in the voluntary market are much more likely to be located in poorer regions which haven’t benefited as much from the compliance market’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In these countries, high quality voluntary market offset projects are making tangible contributions to poverty alleviation, sustainable development and helping achieve the somewhat elusive Millennium Development Goals.

The voluntary carbon market’s high quality VER standards provide some specific and unique benefits: CAR focuses on the North American market. The Gold Standard provides premium development benefits. The VCS is renowned for its innovation particularly with its AFOLU forestry and land use programme and its tagging system which combines Voluntary Carbon Units (VCUs) with SOCIALCARBON sustainable development or CCBA biodiversity standards.

The development of forestry standards – ala VCS REDD methodologies – are a great example of where the voluntary market reaches sectors that other markets cannot reach. The compliance carbon market is now trailing as the voluntary market leads on developing standards to certify high quality and permanent forestry offsets which are combined with robust insurance mechanisms.

The voluntary market is creating innovative new programs, such as the Gold Standard VER methodology for cook stove projects, which significantly reduces deforestation and alleviates respiratory health issues. This market is developing projects that are adaptable and flexible and provide the range of benefits that customers are looking for when they voluntarily reduce their emissions.

Who Else can Help Maximize the Voluntary Carbon Market’s Potential?

Governments, NGOs and the media around the world can continue to provide support, guidance and constructive criticism for the voluntary market – joining organisations like ICROA, with its self-regulatory, externally audited Code that helps promote best practice.

NGOs in particular will benefit from embracing carbon finance from the voluntary carbon market as a solution to their objectives for increasing sustainable development and reducing environmental degradation.

Companies that make emission reduction commitments using the voluntary market must also be duly recognised so that not making these commitments becomes the rare exception. Responsible voluntary market players need to continue promoting transparency and accountability by using high quality offset credits.

The voluntary carbon market has spent a lot of time apologising for the small percentage and often historical instances of project failure. The market now needs to spend more time capitalising on the unique benefits and value that it provides.

In these times of hesitation and delay, the voluntary carbon market is providing a viable alternative to the international and domestic legislative gridlock. In many countries, the voluntary market is the only option for companies that do not yet have legal carbon reduction requirements but that want and need to take action. Describe last year as “the size of a mouse [with] the roar of a lion,” the voluntary carbon market must be championed so that in the coming years it will also become the size of a lion.

No Correlation Between Democracy and Forest Governance

As UN negotiators scramble to develop a global mechanism for generating carbon credits by saving rainforests, individual countries are moving ahead with their own plans.   Research published last year, however, shows that most of those plans are woefully out of synch with each other – a fact that could have dire consequences for the development of a truly global carbon market.

14 February 2011 | All markets differ from region to region.   Soybean meal from Brazil, for example, has a higher protein content than does soybean meal from the United States, which makes it especially popular in China.   But the two products resemble each other enough that a Chinese buyer will grudgingly accept the latter in lieu of the former – albeit at an agreed upon discount.

That’s one of the things that makes soybean meal a commodity‘, and its status as a commodity is one of the things that makes it so easy to trade.

Carbon offsets aren’t much different: to work, they need to be commoditized and traded across jurisdictions.   That’s especially true of offsets that slow climate change by saving rainforests and reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD).   It is only when offsets follow the same rules around the world that an emitter in Chicago can offset his footprint by saving rainforest in Brazil, Columbia, and Kenya.

Constance L. McDermott, Benjamin Cashore, and Peter Kanowski offer disturbing evidence that this isn’t happening.   In Global Environmental Forest Policies: An International Comparison, published last year, they have provided the first concise, systematic approach to analyzing the global diverse forest management landscape.

The 22 figures in Chapter Two alone (Selection and Global Context of the Case Study Countries) should be required reading for anyone interested in forest management for production, protection or both.

Setting the Scene

Forest management policies can be opaque and confusing, and when increased interest internationally is developing for a global UN REDD+ framework that includes both the private and public sector, maybe UN negotiators and the general public can learn from framework used by the authors. The authors eloquently define forest management policies in four categories:

  1. Procedural with suggested planning processes.
  2. Procedural with mandatory planning requirements.
  3. Substantive with suggested performance measures.
  4. Substantive with prescribed performance requirements.

This framework allows for a general comparison between leading countries that are involved in both forest products manufacturing and forest raw materials production.

Wide Policy Disparities

Questions arise even within countries, like why is less than 5% of SE US forests in IUCN Categories I – VI protected forests? Further gap analysis also demonstrates disparity between regions, leading to question like why does Eurasia and Africa have the smallest percentage of protected forests, while Australasia and the Neotropics have the greatest percentage? Also, how forestland is designated provides general contextual comparison opportunities. For example, why does Japan have 0% of its forests designated as protected for conservation?

In the Fine Print

As the authors further narrow down their analysis, remarkable data points come to the surface which may reflect misapplication of global forest management policies. For example, in regards to riparian buffer zones – the most prescriptive of all the policies analyzed – clearly strange bedfellows arise with the DRC, Mexico, and Indonesia as they all have the same prescriptive riparian buffer management policy for a specific stream type regardless of stream sizes. Even more remarkable is the fact that developed countries, in general, have fewer prescriptive nominal requirements for riparian buffers than developing countries. Even in forest road culvert size at stream crossings and road abandonment, there are greater similarities between Chile and the DRC and US policy regarding voluntary procedures for the SE states than between the western and eastern US states.

What Does this Mean for REDD+?

The devil’s in the details regarding the key takeaways from Global Environmental Forest Policies, and considering how REDD+ will be enacted. While much is made of the constant chatter surrounding REDD+ and community property and indigenous rights, it might also be suggested that the policies surrounding REDD+ regarding forest management pursue ecologically sound and consistent criteria.   You learn from the excellent comparative analysis in this book that one size does not fit all.

NGOs Need to Walk Softly and Hang Tough

Scores of non-governmental organizations are trying to help indigenous people out of poverty by showing them how to earn carbon credits for managing their forests, but not all are getting results.  NGO veteran James Gray says that if NGOs really want to help, they have to cede more control to indigenous groups – and they have to convince those groups that they’re in it for the long haul.  He offers this example from his own experience with CARE in Guatemala.

7 February 2011 | When Roberto Chuc joined CARE, he did so because of our reputation as a humanitarian organization.  He believed that by working with us, he could help pull his Mayan tribe, the K’iche’, out of poverty while still preserving the forests where his family and ancestors have lived and farmed communally for hundreds of years.

He took full advantage of the voluntary carbon market to achieve his goals by helping his people earn carbon credits by saving trees and reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) – apropos, since the name of his tribe translates into English as “many trees”.

But REDD is a tool available to many, and very few deliver the kind of results that Chuc has done for us and his people.

That’s because, in addition to helping his people master the intricacies of REDD, he was able to assure them that CARE had the staying power to see the project through to its conclusion, and he knew when to get out of the way.

Light Touch; Long History

CARE’s history of fighting poverty with forest-carbon projects dates back to 1989, when it helped create what some consider to be the world’s first forest-carbon project, a partnership between CARE and AES, a Fortune-500 corporation that generates and distributes electrical power.   Our history of empowering impoverished Guatemalans—and the crucial credibility it gained through this — dates back further still.

We have been working in development and relief capacities throughout Guatemala since 1959, and and our activities range from helping with natural-resource related projects as to providing education, health, sanitation and micro-loans.  When torrential rains from Tropical Storm Agatha pounded this country in  May, 2010, killing more than 150 people and leaving more than 100 still missing from land slides, CARE mobilized an emergency rescue team to help.

All of this lends us credibility that can only be gained over time, but many of the groups we work with tell us that our reputation for pitching in without taking over contributes to our current success with forest carbon projects.

“We don’t try to manipulate local plans,” Chuc says, “but rather promote good planning and respect the rights of both large and small organizations.”

This Land is my Land

Impoverished Mayan people, largely from the K’iche’ and Mam tribes, eke out a living through subsistence agriculture on the marginal land and steep slopes that make up most of CARE’s project area.

This indigenous group survived hundreds of years of oppression, first at the hands of Spanish conquerors, later at the hands of the ladino/mestizo elites that took over prime agricultural land and more recently by brutally repressive military dictators who killed more than 200,000 people during Guatemala’s 36-year civil war.

When the war finally ended, peace accords enacted in 1996 recognized indigenous communities’ inherent right to administer and utilize their collective lands enabling them to retain significant communal holdings. These communal and municipal forests remain a symbol of identity and autonomy.

But the troubled history left lingering tensions and wariness among indigenous communities of interventions that could affect their land rights.  For instance, outside mining interests are typically met with vehement rejection.

Conversely, their long history with CARE fostered trust.  And their right to administer and utilize their collective lands enabled municipalities to enter into Payments for Ecosystem Services “PES” contracts with municipal and community forests.

Forestry vs Farming

Given the abundance of land with steep slopes, Guatemala’s Western Highlands are well-suited to forestry.  The land produces clean water, timber, non-timber forest products and fuel wood, a principal energy source.

But small-holder agriculturalists, population growth and lack of access to more appropriate land induced changes in land use from forest to agriculture, especially in areas with steep slopes, according to a study by Edwin Castellanos and Claudia Flores and their respective teams from Universidad del Valle de Guatemala and CARE Guatemala.

Other causes of deforestation or forest degradation uncovered by CARE’s technical- assistants include intentionally set fires, unchecked pests, human infrastructure, legal and illegal exploitation of fuel wood and poorly defined forest boundaries.
The deforestation rate in CARE’s carbon sequestration project area averages 1.6% per year according to the latest available national statistics on forest cover from the Universidad del Valle and two forest-related government agencies, the Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas (National Council of Protected Areas or CONAP)and Instituto Nacional de Bosques (National Forest Institute or INAB)

CARE Collaborates with AES

CARE executives recognized the value of the ecosystem services this endangered forested land provides, particularly in terms of forests’ ability to sequester carbon. They served as a conduit between the AES Corp. that was building a new power plant that would emit carbon into the atmosphere and the indigenous Maya people, encouraging payments for ecosystem services in exchange for forest preservation.

This collaboration with AES consists of two 10-year phases. Phase 1, running from 1989-1999, emphasized agroforestry that integrates the benefits of combining forests with farming, such as sheep herding, and afforestation that plants seeds to create and restore forests.

In Phase 2 that ran from 1999 until 2009 , collaboration also included conservation of forests with communal and municipal tenure.  Dubbed “MIBOSQUE” –pronounced “me BAWskay” or “my forest” in English, Phase 2 helped set up municipal forest offices in 11 municipalities.  It staffed offices with technical experts.  And it supported improved forest-management efforts.  Initiatives included establishing and supporting community tree nurseries, regulating fuel-wood gathering and tree harvesting, expanding access to agroforestry systems and improving protection of the communal forests.

The Go-to Guy

In the Guatemala municipality called Cabrican, Trancito Lopez is known as the “go-to guy.” As director of one of Guatemala’s municipal forest offices he makes home visits to farmers interested in starting agroforestry systems to integrate the benefits of forestry and farming. He advises those curious about growing orchards and tree plantations.  He even serves as the local custodian for hundreds of hectares of forest in communal ownership.

His local, roll-up-your-sleeves approach personifies what many consider the key to CARE’s success with its Guatemala forest carbon projects.

Springboard to REDD

CARE initially funds the full cost of municipal forest offices and decreases funding over time.  It uses this strategy to illustrate the value of municipal forests offices and promote their long-term independence.

MIBOSQUE served as a philanthropic experiment that was financed through an endowment. No carbon credits were ever transacted.  Yet it had elements of a forest carbon project.  First, while monitoring was not stringent, AES and CARE attempted to increase the amount of carbon sequestered in biomass in the project area. Second, CARE and the Universidad del Valle jointly developed a methodology for estimating carbon stocks in the forest types found in the project area. And third, by applying this methodology to most MIBOSQUE communal and municipal forests, it established part of the carbon baseline for future projects.

These projects now serve as a springboard for CARE’s third-generation forest- carbon initiative, a REDD project covering 70,000 ha of communal forests spanning more than 100 separate forests in 40 municipalities. The project will apply the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS) that CARE helped develop, a standard based on general design concepts that does not issue carbon credit certificates. It will also apply the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) to issue carbon credits.

Leaping Hurdles

Creating a REDD project on the steep slopes of fragmented forests in a third-world country comes, of course, with significant hurdles. The project’s dispersed nature will create challenges during all project stages. Agents and drivers of deforestation will have to be determined.  A reference region will need to be selected. Accurate monitoring efforts will have to be enforced.  And a methodology for creating a Voluntary Carbon Standard will have to be developed.

Financing poses another significant challenge. Because of the project’s complexity, carbon finance funds by themselves may not be sufficient to cover administrative costs as well as funnel adequate funds for communities’ communal needs. To address this possible shortfall, CARE is seeking donors to fund municipal forest offices and their work in community forestry and agroforestry. Meanwhile, while some CARE staff says they are confident that granting unrestricted funds to communities will work well since this is often done in the context of the national forest incentive program, others say they fear these funds could create conflict within communities.

The issue of leakage – protecting one forest at the expense of another – will also have to be addressed. Regulating fuel-wood trade could prove daunting due to its extensive use and movement across the entire region.  Already communities have protected their own forests by importing fuel wood from neighboring regions with laxer regulation. To satisfy local demand for fuel-wood while shutting off leakage, the REDD project will need to improve regulation of fuel-wood collection, increase reforestation by leveraging community tree nurseries and volunteerism, expand agroforestry systems and introduce high-efficiency stoves that require less fuel.

Additionality provides a final challenge, particularly among the 11 municipalities where CARE worked in Phases 1 and 2.  Since many carbon sequestration measures including municipal forest offices and agroforestry systems remain despite CARE’s termination of financial support, efforts will have to be redoubled to preserve and restore additional forests that produce additional carbon sequestration. On the other hand, additionality will be easier to demonstrate and lessons learned from past initiatives will be easier to implement in the remaining 29 municipalities where CARE forest projects have not already occurred.

Promises Kept

As Tropical Storm Agatha’s devastation demonstrated, vulnerability to extreme climatic tendencies is staggering.  CARE hopes to leverage REDD as a key tool to make the communities and forests of Guatemala’s Western Highlands more resilient in the face of potentially devastating effects of climate change.  Its decentralized strategy could help overcome the significant challenges of poverty, resource loss and degradation over a large area with significant but patchy forest resources. If CARE’s REDD project continues as planned, at least 40 municipalities could be much better off economically and environmentally than they are today.“I’ve been told that the difference between us (at CARE) and some other organizations,” Chuc said,”is that CARE comes through on what it offers.”

Maryland Sets Pace for Chesapeake Water Quality

The US State of Maryland has a history of putting innovative ideas into practice when it comes to the environment.   Over the past three years, for example, it has quietly implemented one of North America’s most sophisticated large-scale payments for watersheds services programs, and now it’s developing a statewide system of ecosystem services.

3 February 2011 | Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley’s Ecosystem Services Working Group (ESWG) will be meeting on Friday to iron out the remaining differences in its Interim Report on Ecosystem Services.   More than four months in the making, a preliminary draft circulated last week lays out a detailed analysis of the need for developing a statewide payments for ecosystem services (PES) approach to dealing with environmental problems.

Such mechanisms deliver better results than old-fashioned command-and-control regulation because they are driven by ecosystem science, and not by political considerations.   They begin by determining how much pollution a given body of water can reasonably absorb (usually a total maximum daily load, or TMDL), and then use that as a cap on total discharges. Farms, cities, and others who redeuce their discharges more than they have to can sell their allowances to entities that aren’t able to do so.  

The reductions are often deeper and more cost-effective than traditional methods, because the market sets a concrete. science-based goal and adds an incentive to meet that goal in the most cost-effective way possible.

That, it turns out, is what the state’s Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays Trust Fund has been doing since 2007.

The Trust Fund is essentially a water quality incentive program that pays urban and rural landowners to reduce nutrient and sediment run-off from their land.

The money comes from taxes on motor fuel and rental cars, so it’s not, in the purest definion, a PES mechanism.   That’s because PES technically requires the money to come either from someone who benefits from an ecosystem service — such as a brewery or a filtration plant — or someone who simply can’t meet their own target efficiently.  

Still, the program sets concrete, verifiable targets and creates a mechanism for verifying their achievement.   To date, more than $38 million have been paid to reduce runoff by 1.5 millions pounds of nitrogen, 117,000 pounds phosphorus, and 111 tons of sediment.   Indeed, it offers a solid template for future mechanisms designed to reduce runoff into the Chesapeake Bay.

On January 24, Governor Martin O’Malley proposed a 25% increase in funding for the Trust Fund, to $25 million in fiscal 2012.

How it Works

Water pollution comes from two sources: “point” and “nonpoint”.

Point sources are the ones we hear about the most: industrial enterprises or urban waste treatment plants that directly pollute a watershed from a single pipe or point.

Nonpoint sources, on the other hand, include farms, septic systems and new development whose pollution washes into a watershed over a diffuse area, usually in the form of run-off, and they account for a whopping 80% of the nitrogen and phosphorous that ends up in US waters – and most of these are unregulated, for a variety of political, social, economic, and logistical reasons.
 
The Maryland Fund is designed to specifically support projects that reduce non-point source pollution to Maryland’s portion of the Chesapeake Bay and its coastal bays.   Its success shows that environmental market programs achieve their goal of improving the efficiency, accountability, transparency and, most importantly, the effectiveness of achieving environmental goals.

Markets are not, however, a panacea.   They simply provide a tool for achieving cleaner water and healthier ecosystems more efficiently and effectively.   That tool, likewise, doesn’t exist on its own.   To achieve scale, it will be embedded in a larger systemic approach – like the one Governor O’Malley’s team are chewing over this Friday.

 

Additional resources

On the Blog: Voluntary Carbon Fills Compliance Void

NOTE: This article appeared first on EKO-ECO Blog.   You can view the original here.

18 February 2010 | Last week, Ecosystem Marketplace reported that a major formal voluntary carbon standard has verified its first carbon credits from projects that reduce greenhouse-gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD).

It’s the kind of mechanism that was pioneered and vastly improved in the voluntary carbon markets long before regulators felt comfortable enough to formally admit REDD mechanisms into an international compliance carbon market. Now, REDD is considered to be one of the few success stories at UN climate talks over the past few years.

Though small in comparison to the UN’s Kyoto (and post-Kyoto?) carbon markets, the US state of California’s cap-and-trade scheme is another program soon to hit the market, aiming to start in 2012. This market also employs protocols for project development that originated in the voluntary carbon market, adopting four protocols from the Climate Action Reserve (CAR) that can be used to generate early action credits. The program’s compliance-grade protocols will also be based on CAR’s designs.

Finally, voluntary third-party standards – including CAR, the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and their advisers – are engaging governments around the world to pioneer accounting systems for REDD projects and policies to co-exist within national and sub-national forestry efforts.

Now more than ever – and especially as compliance carbon markets face continued controversy – it is important to recognize and learn from these and other voluntary carbon mechanisms to foster market integrity as a whole.

But even as the voluntary carbon market becomes increasingly integrated with compliance markets worldwide, we continue to observe a niche of voluntary buyers who give the market its name and finance its frontier innovations – and will persist in the marketplace with or without government signals.

The Role of Voluntary Carbon Markets

Companies, organizations and individuals use the voluntary carbon market to set and achieve scientifically informed targets, using a combination of internal and external reductions (i.e. offsets). Companies can make and honor real commitments to significantly reduce their emissions.

The voluntary carbon market plays different roles in different countries and regions. In developed countries that are part of the Kyoto Protocol, the voluntary market makes it possible for companies and individuals who are not covered by existing climate legislation to receive carbon credits for significantly reducing their emissions.

Even companies with existing compliance obligations have made reduction commitments “above and beyond” their obligation by buying voluntary credits.

Companies located in industrialized countries that don’t have domestic cap-and-trade legislation (i.e. the U.S. and Australia) can also use the voluntary market for “pre-compliance purposes.” They learn how the carbon markets and impending legislation would work in practice – and hope to be recognized for taking “early action” to reduce emissions.

In the Global South, companies in middle income countries – particularly those involved in European supply chains – are also taking voluntary action to reduce their emissions.

The voluntary carbon market offers corporate leaders a unique opportunity to show real leadership through action rather than spouting empty rhetoric. Contrast this with business leaders who signed up to the Copenhagen Communiqué on Climate Change – which urged governments to sign a global deal at the 2009 Conference of Parties mandating deep, immediate reductions in emissions but didn’t see results.

While international and domestic climate negotiations stagnate, corporate leaders can actually lead. By voluntarily providing critical funding to emissions reduction projects in the developing world, corporations show true leadership ahead of being mandated to do so by governments. And they have already done so, to the tune of US$387 million invested in voluntary carbon credits in 2009. Indices like the FTSE4Good and the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index have significantly incentivized corporates to become involved in the voluntary carbon market. This involvement has had a direct impact on the companies’ market capitalization.

But the global financial crisis threw a wrench in the voluntary carbon market’s previously unstoppable expansion. You see, companies that aren’t legally required to reduce their emissions do so voluntarily and these commitments are often integrated into a company’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and marketing budget – which is ultimately discretionary. And tough business climates squeeze discretionary budgets first.

In countries without a cap-and-trade programme in sight, pre-compliance activity is slowing down in the voluntary carbon marketplace. There is a limit on how much preparatory action can be taken under continued uncertainty and these countries have been in pre-compliance mode since as early as 2008!

How can the Voluntary Carbon Market Meet these Challenges Head on?

Despite the slow-down in pre-compliance activity, the voluntary carbon market is still equipped to achieve exponential growth if it is able to recognize and communicate its assets – like high quality independent, robust third-party standards which require independent validation and verification to ensure that the offset credits certified are permanent, additional and real.

Standards like CAR and VCS – and also the Gold Standard and CarbonFix forestry standard, among others – have independent registries so that the offsets can be tracked from origination to retirement. This helps create a more transparent and accountable market.

High quality VER standards also demonstrate how the voluntary carbon market is creating the types of projects which were envisaged with the creation of the Kyoto Protocol: emission reduction projects that are delivering real carbon reductions and social and development benefits.

For example, offset projects in the voluntary market are much more likely to be located in poorer regions which haven’t benefited as much from the compliance market’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In these countries, high quality voluntary market offset projects are making tangible contributions to poverty alleviation, sustainable development and helping achieve the somewhat elusive Millennium Development Goals.

The voluntary carbon market’s high quality VER standards provide some specific and unique benefits: CAR focuses on the North American market. The Gold Standard provides premium development benefits. The VCS is renowned for its innovation particularly with its AFOLU forestry and land use programme and its tagging system which combines Voluntary Carbon Units (VCUs) with SOCIALCARBON sustainable development or CCBA biodiversity standards.

The development of forestry standards – ala VCS REDD methodologies – are a great example of where the voluntary market reaches sectors that other markets cannot reach. The compliance carbon market is now trailing as the voluntary market leads on developing standards to certify high quality and permanent forestry offsets which are combined with robust insurance mechanisms.

The voluntary market is creating innovative new programs, such as the Gold Standard VER methodology for cook stove projects, which significantly reduces deforestation and alleviates respiratory health issues. This market is developing projects that are adaptable and flexible and provide the range of benefits that customers are looking for when they voluntarily reduce their emissions.

Who Else can Help Maximize the Voluntary Carbon Market’s Potential?

Governments, NGOs and the media around the world can continue to provide support, guidance and constructive criticism for the voluntary market – joining organisations like ICROA, with its self-regulatory, externally audited Code that helps promote best practice.

NGOs in particular will benefit from embracing carbon finance from the voluntary carbon market as a solution to their objectives for increasing sustainable development and reducing environmental degradation.

Companies that make emission reduction commitments using the voluntary market must also be duly recognised so that not making these commitments becomes the rare exception. Responsible voluntary market players need to continue promoting transparency and accountability by using high quality offset credits.

The voluntary carbon market has spent a lot of time apologising for the small percentage and often historical instances of project failure. The market now needs to spend more time capitalising on the unique benefits and value that it provides.

In these times of hesitation and delay, the voluntary carbon market is providing a viable alternative to the international and domestic legislative gridlock. In many countries, the voluntary market is the only option for companies that do not yet have legal carbon reduction requirements but that want and need to take action. Describe last year as “the size of a mouse [with] the roar of a lion,” the voluntary carbon market must be championed so that in the coming years it will also become the size of a lion.

Forests are Wild – They Need Effective Governance to tap Their Resources

Editors Sarah Laird, Rebecca McLain, and Rachel P. Wynberg underscore this theme in “Wild Product Governance: Finding Policies that Work for Non-Timber Forest Products.”   They poke and probe through more than a dozen forests in wealthy and developing nations alike.   Their conclusions are always the same. Rules that govern forests must be reworked to make the most of the wealth their wild products offer.

19 January 2010 | From berries to Brazil nuts and oils to herbs, forests provide a wealth of wild products cultivated and sold for their multiple benefits including food, spices and medicines. With an annual global market expected to exceed US$ 11 billion and could surpass three-to-four times this size, these wild products from the forests are now valued enough to have even earned their own acronym, NTFP, short for non-timber forest products.    

Yet, when it comes to oversight and protection, insufficient, confusing and, at times, contradictory laws and procedures dominate forestry governance.   From Brazil to British Columbia and in nations throughout the world, there is often little to no correlation between local activities and regional land-use planning. Local communities are often excluded when non-timber forest products’ legal and procedural frameworks are developed. Rarely are the key issues when it comes to cultivation of labor relations and immigrant status considered when NTFP frameworks are designed.   And few laws and procedures recognize distinctions between subsistence and recreational harvesting or local, commercial and international trade.  

The Time is Now

As forests begin to also be valued for their innate ability to absorb the carbon emissions that otherwise lead to global warming, the time has come for non-timber forest products to be studied and effectively regulated.   Clearly, this is an indispensible part of a forest management plan.

This is the message of Wild Product Governance: Finding Policies that Work for Non-Timber Forest Products and its editors, Sarah Laird, Rebecca McLain, and Rachel Wynberg.   Their book, released in May, provides a much-needed survey that analyzes the legal and economic trends for non-timber forest products markets throughout the world.     By focusing on 13 specific regional studies that span the globe, the book provides project developers, project owners, and communities a resource to analyze legal and economic trends.

Chaos in Washington State

The editors point to NTFP’s oversight in Washington State in the United States as an example of the kind of chaotic, overlapping and insufficient permitting structure that inevitably results in chaos. Here NTFP harvesters working on state and federal lands need entirely different sets of permits to transport, harvest, and sell their wares. Worse still, permitting is rarely enforced.   As a result, forests that once offered local residents an opportunity to gather and sell floral greens to feed an $8 billion U.S. market now facilitate theft on private property by persons working without legal status, the editors say.

Launching into Carbon Sinks

Issues and trends are summarized in the books’ final chapters. Here the reader can begin to link community forest carbon trends with microfinance; NTFPs can be viewed as tools that provide alternative income generation opportunities that can facilitate community forestry forest carbon projects sustainability

Wild Product Governance provides a much-needed launching pad for the analyses of forest products and their potential.   Those involved in carbon markets should evaluate distinctions between various NTFP alternative-income-generation opportunities when considering the potential of community forest carbon projects. They could benefit by a sequel to this book that includes further study, analysis, and measured action of NTFP harvesting practices and reflects the reality of climate change and how this impacts forest-dependent and forest-intersected communities.